The Early Court: Part 1
Part One:
Constitutional Precedents from the Early Court
As the
McLaughlin excerpt indicates, the first Congress—the first Senate, in
particular—turned its attention to creating a federal judiciary soon after the First
Congress convened in 1789. The Senate’s action was not without controversy, for
the Constitution does not require the establishment of a full-blown national
judicial system. The Virginia Plan presented at the Philadelphia constitutional
convention proposed the establishment of a federal judiciary with a supreme
court and lower, or “inferior,” courts. The convention, on a close vote,
rejected this proposal. The convention supported the creation of a national
supreme court, but John Rutledge’s argument that the state courts were quite
adequate to serve as the nation’s trial and intermediate appellate courts seems
to have convinced a narrow majority of the state delegations to reject the
necessity for federal courts below the supreme court.
James Madison and James Wilson, two of the most active and influential members
of the convention, immediately proposed language that made the supreme court
required but gave Congress the discretion to create inferior courts if Congress
saw fit to do so. This compromise was quickly approved and found its way into
the first sentence of Article III of the Constitution:
The
judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish.
McLaughlin also
points out that the power of the newly created Supreme Court to review the
decisions of state courts was “of paramount significance.” This power or
jurisdiction in Section 25 of the 1789 Judiciary Act was to be the central
issue in several cases that we will discuss in the next class.
As you have
probably noticed, none of the three subjects addressed by the Supreme Court
justices in the assigned materials looks quite like a legal case, and the
Supreme Court’s handling of the three matters is also not typical of its usual
methods. The article by Wilfred Ritz makes clear that the Hayburn, the Todd, and
the Chandler cases were all tied to a
series of laws passed by the early Congresses and even earlier by the Congress
under the Articles of Confederation to provide pensions to deserving
Revolutionary War veterans. Under the particular statutes in question, the
Circuit Courts were to review the pensioners’ claims and make a report and
recommendation to the Secretary of War, who would then make a final
determination of whether the claimants should in fact receive pensions.
The Circuit
Courts were each made up of two Supreme Court justices, who “rode circuit,” and
one district court judge. The Circuit Court sitting in North Carolina only had
one Justice (Iredell) at the time; presumably he was to be joined by Justice
Johnson once Johnson was formally sworn in. (Ritz says Johnson did not take his
seat until the full Supreme Court met on August 6, 1792, a date later than the
Circuit Court decision.)
If we look
first at the letters that accompany Hayburn’s Case, we
see that the justices and the district judges that made up the three Circuit
Courts in early 1792 all reacted adversely to their roles as pension
commissioners under the March 23, 1792, version of the pension law. Several of
the justices and district judges expressed their reluctance to serve as
commissioners in their letters to the President. These letters are important
because they indicate the rationale for the justices’ attitudes. Two principles
are part of each of the letters. First, under the principle of separation of
powers, the executive branch alone should be deciding who gets the pensions;
such work is not judicial in nature and therefore not properly part of the
justices’ duties. Secondly, the justices were concerned that the Secretary of
War or, perhaps, Congress, not the justices or the courts, would make the
ultimate determination of pensioners’ claims. In the words of Wilson and Blair:
“Such revision and control [by the legislature or the executive] we deemed
radically inconsistent with the independence of that judicial power which is
vested in the courts.” Both of these principles are relied upon also in the
court statement by Chief Justice Jay, Justice Cushing, and Judge Duane in which
they agree to serve as commissioners, but only by formally wearing two hats or
holding two separate federal offices—federal judges and pension commissioners. (Unlike members of Congress, federal
judges are not prohibited from serving in an executive capacity as well as a
judicial capacity.)
This brings us
to the actual decision in Hayburn’s case. As perhaps
you noticed in Ritz’s article: there was none! The Court took Attorney General
Randolph’s motion for a writ of mandamus under advisement and then adjourned,
apparently never to issue a ruling.
The Court did
formally rule in the Chandler and Todd cases, but again without opinion.
We might take a moment to explain the actual court action in these cases. The
statutes upon which the Hayburn, Chandler,
and Todd cases were based apparently
required the pensioner commissioners/judges to approve the claims and make a
report to the Secretary of War. The Secretary would then inform
the Attorney General, who would go to the Supreme Court and petition for a writ
of mandamus—a court order requiring, in this situation, the Secretary of War to
pay the pensioner what was due. As Professor Ritz points out, there was some
question in the early stages of the Hayburn
case about the Attorney General’s legal status and authority to do so, but that
problem was apparently straightened out and Attorney General Randolph
eventually asked the Court for the writ. As I indicated above, the Court sat on
the request, apparently never getting around to rule
on it.
In the Chandler case, discussed in Professor
Ritz’s article, the Court did rule on a request for the writ: “a mandamus
cannot issue to the Secretary of War for the purpose expressed in the said
motion.” (Note: this means the Court decided that it cannot issue any such
writs under the pension statute, not that it will not issue a writ for Chandler
because it rejects the validity of his particular claim.) But no rationale is
given for the ruling.
Nor
is a rationale given in the court papers of the Todd case, although apparently the Court did explain its reasons to
Attorney General William Bradford. The evidence
of the rationale is very brief, according to Bradford’s letter to Secretary of
War Knox: the Supreme Court “has this day determined (in the case of Yale Todd)
that such adjudications are invalid.” This statement is taken by Professor Ritz
and legal historians to be a Supreme Court determination that the writ of
mandamus procedure required by this statute was unconstitutional. The
Court was refusing to do what Congress by law had required of them. The reasons
for this drastic action are found in the letters and statement that we
discussed above in relation to the Hayburn
case.
Finally, the
letter of Secretary of State Jefferson to the Court asking the justices for an
informal opinion about various legal issues arising from our international
treaties resulted in another precedent-setting “case” which was actually no
court case at all. The Court’s 1793 reply letter to President Washington again
referred to the principle of separation of powers for the Court’s decision to
decline to provide “extrajudicial” opinions. This letter is the first statement
of what has become known as the doctrine of “advisory opinions.” As later
stated by the Court in a number of cases, the judicial power or sole
constitutional function of the federal courts is to decide real cases and
controversies. The Court may not render advisory opinions to the other branches
of government if no actual controversy is before them.
Washington and
Jefferson’s desire for the judges’ help in interpreting treaties was certainly
an admirable one: they wanted to do what’s right. Just this situation had been
addressed in the Virginia Plan at the Philadelphia constitutional convention.
The Plan proposed a “Council of Revision”:
8. Resolved that the Executive
and a convenient number of the National Judiciary, ought to compose a Council
of revision with authority to examine every act of the National Legislature
before it shall operate, & every act of a particular Legislature before a
Negative thereon shall be final; and that the dissent of the said Council shall
amount to a rejection, unless the Act of the National Legislature be again
passed, or that of a particular Legislature be again negatived
by ___ of the members of each branch.
Madison and Wilson repeatedly attempted to get the
convention to approve the Council of Revision proposal, but though the proposal
was debated on several occasions, the convention always rejected it. By
directing Jefferson to write the letter, it seems plausible that Washington,
who was present at the Convention when the Council of Revision was debated, was
attempting to do informally what the Constitution did not formally authorize.
Washington and Jefferson with their letter, like Madison and Wilson at the
convention, were unsuccessful at securing judicial guidance prior to the filing
of a case in court.
What we have seen in these materials is that the early Court
established constitutional doctrines by rather unusual methods, according to
today’s judicial standards, and I do not want you leaving this first class too
confused. Therefore, I am asking you to read a case by the early court that
will be more recognizable as a Court decision and opinion, though still not
quite what you might expect if you have read modern court opinions. Please read
the case of Hylton v. United States,
a 1796 case that also presented a constitutional issue.
As you read the case, ask yourself these questions (I will
answer them at the beginning of the second class):
1. What constitutional question did the case present?
2. Who won the case—Hylton or the United States?
3. What argument did Hylton make regarding the
constitutional issue?
4. What argument did the United States make?
5. What was the Court’s rationale for its decision? Did “the
Court” have a rationale? Was there a Court opinion? Assuming the Court did
explain the reasoning underlying its decision, how—in what form or by what
method—was the opinion rendered? (The answer can be found in “A Few Basic
Points of Law” section above and the opinion itself.)
Note: The numbers in brackets throughout the Hylton opinion and other opinions that
will be assigned in this course refer to the page numbers of the official
edition of the opinions in the United States reports. The Hylton v. United States case
appears in volume 3 of the United States Reports and began on page 171; thus,
the citation for the case is 3 U.S. 171. (The references to “Dall.” or “Wheat.” or “Wall.” In parentheses refer
to the first editions of the opinions prepared by individual court reporter
such as A.J. Dallas, Henry Wheaton, William Wallace, and so on. The reference
to United States Reports has largely superseded the reference to the volumes
prepared by these early reporters.) Legal convention dictates that in referring
to a particular page of the opinion, the number of the volume of the United
States Reports and the number of the first page of the opinion be included. Thus a reference to page 174 of the Hylton opinion would be 3 U.S. 171, 174.
© William S Miller