UNITED STATES v. LOPEZ
514 U.S. 549 (1995)
CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Argued November 8, 1994
Decided April 26, 1995
CHIEF JUSTICE
REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
In the Gun-Free School
Zones Act of 1990, Congress made it a federal offense "for any individual
knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has
reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone." 18 U.S.C. 922(q)(1)(A)
(1988 ed., Supp. V). The Act neither regulates a commercial activity nor
contains a requirement that the possession be connected in any way to
interstate commerce. We hold that the Act exceeds the authority of Congress
"[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several States . . . ." U.S.
Const., Art. I, 8, cl. 3.
On March 10, 1992,
respondent, who was then a 12th-grade student, arrived at Edison High School in
San Antonio, Texas, carrying a concealed .38 caliber handgun and five bullets.
Acting upon an anonymous tip, school authorities confronted respondent, who
admitted that he was carrying the weapon. He was arrested and charged under
Texas law with firearm possession on school premises. See Tex. Penal Code Ann.
46.03(a)(1) (Supp. 1994). The next day, the state charges were dismissed after
federal agents charged respondent by complaint with violating the
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. 18 U.S.C. 922(q)(1)(A) (1988 ed., Supp. V). 1
A federal grand jury
indicted respondent on one count of knowing possession of a firearm at a school
zone, in violation of 922(q). Respondent moved to dismiss his federal
indictment on the ground that 922(q) "is unconstitutional as it is beyond
the power of Congress to legislate control over our public schools." The
District Court denied the motion, concluding that 922(q) "is a
constitutional exercise of Congress' well-defined power to regulate activities
in and affecting commerce, and the `business' of elementary,
middle and high schools . . . affects interstate commerce." App. to Pet.
for Cert. 55a. Respondent waived his right to a jury trial. The District Court
conducted a bench trial, found him guilty of violating 922(q), and sentenced
him to six months' imprisonment and two years' supervised release.
On appeal, respondent
challenged his conviction based on his claim that 922(q) exceeded Congress'
power to legislate under the Commerce Clause. The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit agreed and reversed respondent's conviction. It held that, in light of what it characterized as insufficient
congressional findings and legislative history, "section 922(q), in the
full reach of its terms, is invalid as beyond the power of Congress under the
Commerce Clause." 2 F.3d 1342, 1367-1368 (1993). Because of the importance
of the issue, we granted certiorari, 511 U.S. ___ (1994), and we now affirm.
We start with first
principles. The Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers.
See U.S. Const., Art. I, 8. As James Madison wrote, "[t]he powers
delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and
defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and
indefinite." The Federalist No.
45, pp. 292-293 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). This constitutionally mandated division
of authority "was adopted by the Framers to ensure protection of our
fundamental liberties." Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501
U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). "Just as the
separation and independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal
Government serves to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one
branch, a healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal
Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front."
Ibid.
The Constitution
delegates to Congress the power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S.
Const., Art. I, 8, cl. 3. The Court, through Chief Justice Marshall, first
defined the nature of Congress' commerce power in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 189-190 (1824):
"Commerce, undoubtedly, is
traffic, but it is something more: it is intercourse. It describes the
commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its
branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that
intercourse."
The commerce power "is the power
to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be
governed. This power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and
acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution."
Id., at 196. The Gibbons Court,
however, acknowledged that limitations on the commerce power are inherent in
the very language of the Commerce Clause.
"It is not intended to say that
these words comprehend that commerce, which is completely internal, which is
carried on between man and man in a State, or between different parts of the
same State, and which does not extend to or affect other States. Such a power
would be inconvenient, and is certainly unnecessary.
"Comprehensive as the word `among'
is, it may very properly be restricted to that commerce which concerns more
States than one. . . . The enumeration presupposes something not enumerated;
and that something, if we regard the language or the subject of the sentence,
must be the exclusively internal commerce of a State." Id., at 194-195.
For nearly a century thereafter, the
Court's Commerce Clause decisions dealt but rarely with the extent of Congress'
power, and almost entirely with the Commerce Clause as a limit on state
legislation that discriminated against interstate commerce. See, e.g., Veazie v. Moor, 14 How. 568, 573-575 (1853)
(upholding a state-created steamboat monopoly because it involved regulation of
wholly internal commerce); Kidd v.
Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 17, 20-22 (1888) (upholding a state prohibition on the
manufacture of intoxicating liquor because the commerce power "does not
comprehend the purely domestic commerce of a State which is carried on between
man and man within a State or between different parts of the same State");
see also L. Tribe, American
Constitutional Law 306 (2d ed. 1988). Under this line of precedent, the
Court held that certain categories of activity such as "production,"
"manufacturing," and "mining" were within the province of
state governments, and thus were beyond the power of Congress under the
Commerce Clause. See Wickard v. Filburn,
317
U.S. 111, 121 (1942) (describing development of Commerce Clause
jurisprudence).
In 1887, Congress
enacted the Interstate Commerce Act, 24 Stat. 379, and in 1890, Congress
enacted the Sherman Antitrust Act, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 1 et
seq. These laws ushered in a new era of federal regulation under the commerce
power. When cases involving these laws first reached this Court, we imported
from our negative Commerce Clause cases the approach that Congress could not
regulate activities such as "production," "manufacturing,"
and "mining." See, e.g., United
States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895) ("Commerce succeeds
to manufacture, and is not part of it"); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 304 (1936) ("Mining
brings the subject matter of commerce into existence. Commerce disposes of
it"). Simultaneously, however, the Court held that, where the interstate
and intrastate aspects of commerce were so mingled together that full
regulation of interstate commerce required incidental regulation of intrastate
commerce, the Commerce Clause authorized such regulation. See, e.g., Houston, E. & W. T. R. Co. v. United
States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914) (Shreveport Rate Cases).
In A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495, 550 (1935), the Court struck down regulations that
fixed the hours and wages of individuals employed by an intrastate business
because the activity being regulated related to interstate commerce only
indirectly. In doing so, the Court characterized the distinction between direct
and indirect effects of intrastate transactions upon interstate commerce as
"a fundamental one, essential to the maintenance of our constitutional
system." Id., at 548. Activities that affected interstate commerce
directly were within Congress' power; activities that affected interstate commerce
indirectly were beyond Congress' reach. Id., at 546. The justification for this
formal distinction was rooted in the fear that otherwise "there would be
virtually no limit to the federal power and for all practical purposes we
should have a completely centralized government." Id., at 548.
Two years later, in
the watershed case of NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1 (1937), the Court upheld the National Labor Relations Act against a
Commerce Clause challenge, and in the process, departed from the distinction
between "direct" and "indirect" effects on interstate
commerce. Id., at 36-38 ("The question [of the scope of Congress' power]
is necessarily one of degree"). The Court held that intrastate activities
that "have such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce
that their control is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from
burdens and obstructions" are within Congress' power to regulate. Id., at
37.
In United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100 (1941), the Court upheld the Fair Labor Standards Act, stating:
"The power of Congress over
interstate commerce is not confined to the regulation of commerce among the
states. It extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate
commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress over it as to make regulation
of them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the exercise
of the granted power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce." Id., at
118.
See also United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315
U.S. 110, 119 (1942) (the commerce power "extends to those intrastate
activities which in a substantial way interfere with or obstruct the exercise
of the granted power").
In Wickard v. Filburn, the Court upheld the
application of amendments to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 to the
production and consumption of home-grown wheat. 317
U.S., at 128 -129. The Wickard
Court explicitly rejected earlier distinctions between direct and indirect
effects on interstate commerce, stating:
"[E]ven
if appellee's activity be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce,
it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a
substantial economic effect on interstate commerce, and this irrespective of
whether such effect is what might at some earlier time have been defined as
`direct' or `indirect.'" Id., at 125.
The Wickard
Court emphasized that although Filburn's own contribution to the demand for
wheat may have been trivial by itself, that was not "enough to remove him
from the scope of federal regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken
together with that of many others similarly situated, is far from
trivial." Id., at 127-128.
Jones & Laughlin Steel, Darby, and Wickard ushered in an era of Commerce Clause jurisprudence that
greatly expanded the previously defined authority of Congress under that
Clause. In part, this was a recognition of the great changes that had occurred
in the way business was carried on in this country. Enterprises that had once
been local or at most regional in nature had become national in scope. But the
doctrinal change also reflected a view that earlier Commerce Clause cases
artificially had constrained the authority of Congress to regulate interstate
commerce.
But even these
modern-era precedents which have expanded congressional power under the
Commerce Clause confirm that this power is subject to outer limits. In Jones & Laughlin Steel, the Court
warned that the scope of the interstate commerce power "must be considered
in the light of our dual system of government and may not be extended so as to
embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace
them, in view of our complex society, would effectually obliterate the
distinction between what is national and what is local and create a completely
centralized government." 301
U.S., at 37 ; see also Darby, supra,
at 119-120 (Congress may regulate intrastate activity that has a
"substantial effect" on interstate commerce); Wickard, supra, at 125 (Congress may regulate activity that
"exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce"). Since
that time, the Court has heeded that warning and undertaken to decide whether a
rational basis existed for concluding that a regulated activity sufficiently
affected interstate commerce. See, e.g., Hodel
v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452
U.S. 264, 276 -280 (1981); Perez v.
United States, 402
U.S. 146, 155 -156 (1971); Katzenbach
v. McClung, 379
U.S. 294, 299 -301 (1964); Heart of
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379
U.S. 241, 252 -253 (1964).2
* * *
Consistent with this
structure, we have identified three broad categories of activity that Congress
may regulate under its commerce power. Perez
v. United States, supra, at 150; see also Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., supra, at
276-277. First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate
commerce. See, e.g., Darby, 312
U.S., at 114 ; Heart of Atlanta
Motel, supra, at 256 ("`[T]he authority of Congress to keep the
channels of interstate commerce free from immoral and injurious uses has been
frequently sustained, and is no longer open to question.'" (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 491
(1917)). Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate
commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities. See,
e.g., Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342 (1914); Southern R. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20 (1911) (upholding
amendments to Safety Appliance Act as applied to vehicles used in intrastate
commerce); Perez, supra, at 150
("[F]or example, the destruction of an aircraft (18 U.S.C. 32), or . . .
thefts from interstate shipments (18 U.S.C. 659)"). Finally, Congress'
commerce authority includes the power to regulate those activities
having a substantial relation to interstate commerce, Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301
U.S., at 37 , i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate
commerce. [Maryland v.]Wirtz, [392 U.S. 183], at 196, n. 27.
Within this final
category, admittedly, our case law has not been clear whether an activity must
"affect" or "substantially affect" interstate commerce in
order to be within Congress' power to regulate it under the Commerce Clause.
Compare Preseault v. ICC, 494
U.S. 1, 17 (1990), with Wirtz, supra,
at 196, n. 27 (the Court has never declared that "Congress may use a
relatively trivial impact on commerce as an excuse for broad general regulation
of state or private activities"). We conclude, consistent with the great
weight of our case law, that the proper test requires an analysis of whether
the regulated activity "substantially affects" interstate commerce.
We now turn to
consider the power of Congress, in the light of this framework, to enact
922(q). The first two categories of authority may be quickly disposed of:
922(q) is not a regulation of the use of the channels of interstate commerce,
nor is it an attempt to prohibit the interstate transportation of a commodity
through the channels of commerce; nor can 922(q) be justified as a regulation
by which Congress has sought to protect an instrumentality of interstate
commerce or a thing in interstate commerce. Thus, if 922(q) is to be sustained,
it must be under the third category as a regulation of an activity that
substantially affects interstate commerce.
First, we have upheld
a wide variety of congressional Acts regulating intrastate economic activity
where we have concluded that the activity substantially affected interstate
commerce. Examples include the regulation of intrastate coal mining; Hodel, supra, intrastate extortionate
credit transactions, Perez, supra,
restaurants utilizing substantial interstate supplies, McClung, supra, inns and hotels catering to interstate guests, Heart of Atlanta Motel, supra, and
production and consumption of home-grown wheat, Wickard v. Filburn, 317
U.S. 111 (1942). These examples are by no means exhaustive, but the pattern
is clear. Where economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce,
legislation regulating that activity will be sustained.
Even Wickard, which is perhaps the most far
reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity,
involved economic activity in a way that the possession of a gun in a school
zone does not. Roscoe Filburn operated a small farm in Ohio, on which, in the
year involved, he raised 23 acres of wheat. It was his practice to sow winter
wheat in the fall, and after harvesting it in July to sell a portion of the
crop, to feed part of it to poultry and livestock on the farm, to use some in
making flour for home consumption, and to keep the remainder for seeding future
crops. The Secretary of Agriculture assessed a penalty against him under the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 because he harvested about 12 acres more
wheat than his allotment under the Act permitted. The Act was designed to
regulate the volume of wheat moving in interstate and foreign commerce in order
to avoid surpluses and shortages, and concomitant fluctuation in wheat prices,
which had previously obtained. The Court said, in an opinion sustaining the
application of the Act to Filburn's activity:
"One of the primary purposes of
the Act in question was to increase the market price of wheat and to that end
to limit the volume thereof that could affect the market. It can hardly be
denied that a factor of such volume and variability as home-consumed wheat
would have a substantial influence on price and market conditions. This may
arise because being in marketable condition such wheat overhangs the market
and, if induced by rising prices, tends to flow into the market and check price
increases. But if we assume that it is never marketed, it supplies a need of
the man who grew it which would otherwise be reflected by purchases in the open
market. Home-grown wheat in this sense competes with wheat in commerce." 317
U.S., at 128 .
Section 922(q) is a criminal statute
that by its terms has nothing to do with "commerce" or any sort of
economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms. 3 Section 922(q) is not an essential part of a
larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be
undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated. It cannot, therefore,
be sustained under our cases upholding regulations of activities that arise out
of or are connected with a commercial transaction, which viewed in the
aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce.
Second, 922(q)
contains no jurisdictional element which would ensure, through case-by-case
inquiry, that the firearm possession in question affects interstate commerce.
For example, in United States v. Bass,
404
U.S. 336 (1971), the Court interpreted former 18 U.S.C. 1202(a), which made
it a crime for a felon to "receiv[e], posses[s],
or transpor[t] in commerce or affecting commerce . .
. any firearm." 404
U.S., at 337 . The Court interpreted the possession component of 1202(a) to
require an additional nexus to interstate commerce both because the statute was
ambiguous and because "unless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will
not be deemed to have significantly changed the federal-state balance."
Id., at 349. The Bass Court set aside
the conviction because although the Government had demonstrated that Bass had
possessed a firearm, it had failed "to show the requisite nexus with
interstate commerce." Id., at 347. The Court thus interpreted the statute
to reserve the constitutional question whether Congress could regulate, without
more, the "mere possession" of firearms. See id., at 339, n. 4; see
also United States v. Five Gambling
Devices, 346
U.S. 441, 448 (1953) (plurality opinion) ("The principle is old and
deeply imbedded in our jurisprudence that this Court will construe a statute in
a manner that requires decision of serious constitutional questions only if the
statutory language leaves no reasonable alternative"). Unlike the statute
in Bass, 922(q) has no express
jurisdictional element which might limit its reach to a discrete set of firearm
possessions that additionally have an explicit connection with or effect on
interstate commerce.
* * *
These are not precise formulations, and
in the nature of things they cannot be. But we think they point the way to a
correct decision of this case. The possession of a gun in a local school zone
is in no sense an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere,
substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce. Respondent was a local
student at a local school; there is no indication that he had recently moved in
interstate commerce, and there is no requirement that his possession of the
firearm have any concrete tie to interstate commerce.
To uphold the
Government's contentions here, we would have to pile inference upon inference
in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the
Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States.
Admittedly, some of our prior cases have taken long steps down that road,
giving great deference to congressional action. See supra, at 8. The broad
language in these opinions has suggested the possibility of additional
expansion, but we decline here to proceed any further. To do so would require
us to conclude that the Constitution's enumeration of powers does not
presuppose something not enumerated, cf. Gibbons
v. Ogden, supra, at 195, and that there never will be a distinction between
what is truly national and what is truly local, cf. Jones & Laughlin Steel, supra, at 30. This we are unwilling to
do.
For the foregoing
reasons the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
Justices Stevens,
Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg dissented.