Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan
293 U.S. 388, 405-412, 420-433, 55 S.Ct. 241, 79 L.Ed. 446 (1935).
Mr. Chief Justice HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court.
On July 11, 1933, the President, by Executive Order No. 6199 (15 USCA 709 note), prohibited 'the transportation in interstate and foreign commerce of petroleum and the products thereof produced or withdrawn from storage in excess of the amount permitted to be produced or withdrawn from storage by any State law or valid regulation or order prescribed thereunder, by any board, commission, officer, or other duly [293 U.S. 388, 406] authorized agency of a State.' 1 This action was based on section 9(c) of title 1 of the National Industrial Recovery Act of June 16, 1933, 48 Stat. 195, 200, 15 U.S.C. tit. 1, 709(c), 15 USCA 709(c). That section provides:
'Sec. 9. ...
'(c) The President is authorized to prohibit the transportation in interstate and foreign commerce of petroleum and the products thereof produced or withdrawn from storage in excess of the amount permitted to be produced or withdrawn from storage by any State law or valid regulation or order prescribed thereunder, by any board, commission, officer, or other duly authorized agency of a State. Any violation of any order of the President issued under the provisions of this subsection shall be punishable by fine of not to exceed $1,000, or imprisonment for not to exceed six months, or both.'
On July 14, 1933, the President, by Executive Order No. 6204 (15 USCA 709 note), authorized the Secretary of the Interior to exercise all the powers vested in the President 'for the purpose of en- [293 U.S. 388, 407] forcing Section 9(c) of said act and said order' of July 11, 1933, 'including full authority to designate and appoint such agents and to set up such boards and agencies as he may see fit, and to promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary.' 2 That order was made under section 10(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act, 48 Stat. 200, 15 U.S.C. 710(a), 15 USCA 710(a), authorizing the President 'to prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes' of title 1 of the National Industrial Recovery Act and providing that 'any violation of any such rule or regulation shall be punishable by fine of not to exceed $500, or imprisonment for not to exceed six months, or both.'
On July 15, 1933, the Secretary of the Interior issued regulations to carry out the President's orders of July 11 and 14, 1933. These regulations were amended by orders [293 U.S. 388, 408] of July 25, 1933, and August 21, 1933, prior to the commencement of these suits. Regulation IV provided, in substance, that every producer of petroleum should file a monthly statement under oath, beginning August 15, 1933, with the Division of Investigations of the Department of the Interior giving information with respect to the residence and post office address of the producer, the location of his producing properties and wells, the allowable production as prescribed by state authority, the amount of daily production, all deliveries of petroleum, and declaring that no part of the petroleum or products produced and shipped had been produced or withdrawn from storage in excess of the amount permitted by state authority. Regulation V required every purchaser, shipper (other than a producer), and refiner of petroleum, including processors, similarly to file a monthly statement under oath, giving information as to residence and post office address, the place and date of receipt, the parties from whom and the amount of petroleum received and the amount held in storage, the disposition of the petroleum, particulars as to deliveries, and declaring, to the best of the affiant's information and belief, that none of the petroleum so handled had been produced or withdrawn from storage in excess of that allowed by state authority. Regulation VII provided that all persons embraced within the terms of section 9(c) of the act, 15 USCA 709(a) and the executive orders and regulations issued thereunder, should keep 'available for inspection by the Division of Investigations of the Department of the Interior adequate books and records of all transactions involving the production and transportation of petroleum and the products thereof.'
On August 19, 1933, the President, by Executive Order No. 6256, stating that his action was taken under title 1 of the National Industrial Recovery Act, approved a 'Code of [293 U.S. 388, 409] Fair Competition for the Petroleum Industry.' 3 By a further Executive Order of August 28, 1933, the President designated the Secretary of the Interior as Administrator, and the Department of the Interior as the federal agency, to exercise on behalf of the President all the powers vested in him under that act and code. Section 3(f) of title 1 of the National Industrial Recovery Act, 15 USCA 703(f), provides that, when a code of fair competition has been approved or prescribed by the President under that title, 'any violation of any provision thereof in any transaction in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce shall [293 U.S. 388, 410] be a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof an offender shall be fined not more than $500 for each offense, and each day such violation continues shall be deemed a separate offense.'
This 'Petroleum Code' (in its original form and as officially printed) provided in section 3 of article III relating to 'Production' for estimates of 'required production of crude oil to balance consumer demand for petroleum products' to be made at intervals by the federal agency. This 'required production' was to be 'equitably allocated' among the several states. These estimates and allocations, when approved by the President, were to be deemed to be 'the net reasonable market demand,' and the allocations were to be recommended 'as the operating schedules for the producing States and for the industry.' By section 4 of article III, the subdivision, with respect to producing properties, of the production allocated to each state, was to be made within the state. The second paragraph of that section further provided:
'If any subdivision into quotas of production allocated to any State shall be made within a State any production by any person, as person is defined in Article I, Section 3 of this code in excess of any such quota assigned to him, shall be deemed an unfair trade practice and in violation of this code.'
By an Executive Order of September 13, 1933, No. 6284-a, modifying certain provisions of the Petroleum Code, this second paragraph of section 4 of article III was eliminated. It was reinstated by Executive Order of September 25, 1934, No. 6855
These suits were brought in October, 1933.
In No. 135, the Panama Refining Company, as owner of an oil refining plant in Texas, and its co-plaintiff, a producer having oil and gas leases in Texas, sued to restrain the defendants, who were federal officials, from enforcing Regulations IV, V, and VII prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior under section 9(c) of the National Industrial [293 U.S. 388, 411] Recovery Act. Plaintiffs attacked the validity of section 9(c) as an unconstitutional delegation to the President of legislative power and as transcending the authority of the Congress under the commerce clause. The regulations, and the attempts to enforce them by coming upon the properties of the plaintiffs, gauging their tanks, digging up pipe lines, and otherwise, were also assailed under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the Constitution.
In No. 260, the Amazon Petroleum Corporation and its co-plaintiffs, all being oil producers in Texas and owning separate properties, sued to enjoin the Railroad Commission of that state, its members and other state officers, and the other defendants who were federal officials, from enforcing the state and federal restrictions upon the production and disposition of oil. The bill alleged that the legislation of the state and the orders of its commission in curtailing production violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. As to the federal requirements, the bill not only attacked section 9(c) of the National Industrial Recovery Act, and the regulations of the Secretary of the Interior thereunder, upon substantially the same grounds as those set forth in the bill of the Panama Refining Company, but also challenged the validity of provisions of the Petroleum Code. While a number of these provisions were set out in the bill, the contest on the trial related to the limitation of production through the allocation of quotas pursuant to section 4 of article III of the code.
As the case involved the constitutional validity of orders of the state commission and an interlocutory injunction was sought, a court of three judges was convened under section 266 of the Judicial Code (28 U.S.C . 380 (28 USCA 380)). That court decided that the cause of action against the federal officials was not one within section 266, but was for the consideration of the District Judge alone. The parties agreed that the causes of action should be severed and that each cause [293 U.S. 388, 412] should be submitted to the tribunal having jurisdiction of it. Hearing was had both on the applications for interlocutory injunction and upon the merits. The court of three judges, sustaining the state orders, denied injunction, and dismissed the bill as against the state authorities. Amazon Petroleum Corp. v. Railroad Comm. (D.C.) 5 F.Supp. 633, 634, 639.
In both cases against the federal officials, that of the Panama Refining Company and that of the Amazon Petroleum Corporation, heard by the District Judge, a permanent injunction was granted. 5 F.Supp. 639. In the case of the Amazon Petroleum Corporation, the court specifically enjoined the defendants from enforcing section 4 of article III of the Petroleum Code; both plaintiffs and defendants and the court being unaware of the amendment of September 13, 1933.
The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decrees against the federal officials and directed that the bills be dismissed. Ryan v. Amazon Petroleum Corp., 71 F.(2d) 1; Ryan v. Panama Refining Co., 71 F.(2d) 8. The cases come here on writs of certiorari granted on October 8, 1934, 293 U.S. 539 ; 293 U.S. 539 .
* * * *
Fifth. The question whether such a delegation of legislative power is permitted by the Constitution is not answered by the argument that it should be assumed that the President has acted, and will act, for what he believes to be the public good. The point is not one of motives, but of constitutional authority, for which the best of motives is not a substitute. While the present controversy relates to a delegation to the President, the basic question has a much wider application. If the Congress can make a grant of legislative authority of the sort attempted by section 9(c), we find nothing in the Constitution which restricts the Congress to the selection of the President as grantee. The Congress may vest the power in the officer of its choice or in a board or commission such as it may select or create for the purpose. Nor, with respect to such a delegation, is the question concerned merely with the transportation of oil, or of oil produced in excess of what the state may allow. If legislative power may thus be vested in the President or other grantee as to that excess of production, we see no reason to doubt that it may similarly be vested with respect to the transportation of oil without reference to the state's requirements. That reference simply defines the subject of the prohibition which the President is authorized to enact or not to enact as he pleases. And, if that legislative power may be given to the President or other grantee, it would seem to follow that such power may similarly be conferred with respect to the transportation of other commodities in interstate commerce with or without reference to state action, thus giving to the grantee of the power the determination of what is a wise policy as to that transportation, and authority to permit or prohibit it, as the person or board or commission so chosen may [293 U.S. 388, 421] think desirable. In that view, there would appear to be no ground for denying a similar prerogative of delegation with respect to other subjects of legislation.
The Constitution provides that 'All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.' Article 1, 1. And the Congress is empowered 'To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution' its general powers. Article 1, 8, par. 18. The Congress manifestly is not permitted to abdicate or to transfer to others the essential legislative functions with which it is thus vested. Undoubtedly legislation must often be adapted to complex conditions involving a host of details with which the national Legislature cannot deal directly. The Constitution has never been regarded as denying to the Congress the necessary resources of flexibility and practicality, which will enable it to perform its function in laying down policies and establishing standards, while leaving to selected instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules within prescribed limits and the determination of facts to which the policy as declared by the Legislature is to apply. Without capacity to give authorizations of that sort we should have the anomaly of a legislative power which in many circumstances calling for its exertion would be but a futility. But the constant recognition of the necessity and validity of such provisions and the wide range of administrative authority which has been developed by means of them cannot be allowed to obscure the limitations of the authority to delegate, if our constitutional system is to be maintained.
The Court has had frequent occasion to refer to these limitations and to review the course of congressional action. At the very outset, amid the disturbances due to war in Europe, when the national safety was imperiled [293 U.S. 388, 422] and our neutrality was disregarded, the Congress passed a series of acts, as a part of which the President was authorized, in stated circumstances, to lay and revoke embargoes, to give permits for the exportation of arms and military stores, to remit and discontinue the restraints and prohibitions imposed by acts suspending commercial intercourse with certain countries, and to permit or interdict the entrance into waters of the United States of armed vessels belonging to foreign nations. 7 These early acts were not the subject of judicial decision, and, apart from that, they afford no adequate basis for a conclusion that the Congress assumed that it possessed an unqualified power of delegation. They were inspired by the vexations of American commerce through the hostile enterprises of the belligerent powers,8 they were directed to the effective execution of policies repeatedly declared by the Congress, and they confided to the President, for the purposes and under the conditions stated, an authority which was cognate to the conduct by him of the foreign relations of the government. 9 [293 U.S. 388, 423] The first case relating to an authorization of this description was that of The Aurora v. United States, 7 Cranch, 382, 388. The cargo of that vessel had been condemned as having been imported from Great Britain in violation of the Nonintercourse Act of March 1, 1809 (2 Stat. 528). That act expired on May 1, 1810,10 when Congress passed another [293 U.S. 388, 424] act (2 Stat. 605, 606) providing that, in case either Great Britain or France before March 3, 1811, 'shall ... so revoke or modify her edicts as that they shall cease to violate the neutral commerce of the United States, which fact the President of the United States shall declare by proclamation, and if the other nation shall not within three months thereafter so revoke or modify her edicts in like manner' (section 4), then, with respect to that nation, as stated, the provisions of the act of 1809, after three months from that proclamation, 'shall ... be revived and have full force and effect.' On November 2, 1810, the President issued his proclamation declaring that France had so revoked or modified her edicts, and it was contended that the provisions of the act of 1809, as to the cargo in question, had thus been revived. The Court said that it could see no sufficient reason why the Legislature should not exercise its discretion in reviving the act of 1809, 'either expressly or conditionally, as their judgment should direct.' The provision of that act declaring 'that it should continue in force to a certain time, and no longer,' could not restrict the power of the Legislature to extend its operation 'without limitation upon the occurrence of any subsequent combination of events.' This was a decision, said the Court in Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 683 , 12 S.Ct. 495, 501, 'that it was competent for congress to make the revival of an act depend upon the proclamation of the president, showing the ascertainment by him of the fact that the edicts of certain nations had been so revoked or modified that they did not violate the neutral commerce of the United States.'
In Field v. Clark, supra, the Court applied that ruling to the case of 'the suspension of an act upon a contingency to be ascertained by the president, and made known by his proclamation.' The Court was dealing with section 3 of the Act of October 1, 1890, 26 Stat. 567, 612. [293 U.S. 388, 425] That section provided that, 'with a view to secure reciprocal trade' with countries producing certain articles, 'whenever, and so often as the President shall be satisfied' that the government of any country producing them imposed 'duties or other exactions upon the agricultural or other products of the United States' which, in view of the free list established by the act, the President 'may deem to be reciprocally unequal and unreasonable, he shall have the power and it shall be his duty,' to suspend the free introduction of those articles by proclamation to that effect, and that during that suspension the duties specified by the section should be levied. The validity of the provision was challenged as a delegation to the President of legislative power. The Court reviewed the early acts to which we have referred, as well as later statutes considered to be analogous. 11 While sustaining the provision, the Court emphatically declared that the principle that 'congress cannot delegate legislative power to the president' is 'universally [293 U.S. 388, 426] recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the constitution.' The Court found that the act before it was not inconsistent with that principle; that it did not 'in any real sense, invest the president with the power of legislation.' As 'the suspension was absolutely required when the president ascertained the existence of a particular fact,' it could not be said 'that in ascertaining that fact, and in issuing his proclamation, in obedience to the legislative will, he exercised the function of making laws.' 'He was the mere agent of the law-making department to ascertain and declare the event upon which its expressed will was to take effect.' Id., pages 692, 693 of 143 U.S., 12 S.Ct. 495, 504, 505. The Court referred with approval to the distinction pointed out by the Supreme Court of Ohio in Cincinnati, Wilmington, etc., Railroad v. Clinton County Commissioners, 1 Ohio St. 88, between 'the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.'
Applying that principle, authorizations given by Congress to selected instrumentalities for the purpose of ascertaining the existence of facts to which legislation is directed have constantly been sustained. Moreover the Congress may not only give such authorizations to determine specific facts, but may establish primary standards, devolving upon others the duty to carry out the declared legislative policy; that is, as Chief Justice Marshall expressed it, 'to fill up the details' under the general provisions made by the Legislature. Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 43. In Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 496 , 24 S.Ct. 349, 352, the Act of March 2, 1897 (29 Stat. 604, 605, 3 (see 21 USCA 43)), was upheld, which authorized the Secretary of the Treasury, upon the recommendation of a board of experts, to 'establish uniform standards of purity, quality, and fitness [293 U.S. 388, 427] for consumption of all kinds of teas imported into the United States.' The Court construed the statute as expressing 'the purpose to exclude the lowest grades of tea, whether demonstrably of inferior purity, or unfit for consumption, or presumably so because of their inferior quality.' The Congress, the Court said, thus fixed 'a primary standard' and committed to the Secretary of the Treasury 'the mere executive duty to effectuate the legislative policy declared in the statute.' 'Congress legislated on the subject as far as was reasonably practicable, and from the necessities of the case was compelled to leave to executive officials the duty of bringing about the result pointed out by the statute.' See Red 'C' Oil Co. v. Board of Agriculture of North Carolina, 222 U.S. 380, 394 , 32 S.Ct. 152.
Another notable illustration is that of the authority given to the Secretary of War to determine whether bridges and other structures constitute unreasonable obstructions to navigation and to remove such obstructions. Act of March 3, 1899, 18, 30 Stat. 1153, 1154 (33 USCA 502). By that statute the Congress declared 'a general rule and imposed upon the Secretary of War the duty of ascertaining what particular cases came within the rule' as thus laid down. Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364, 386 , 27 S.Ct. 367; Monongahela Bridge Co. v. United States, 216 U.S. 177, 193 , 30 S.Ct. 356; Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605, 638 , 32 S.Ct. 340. Upon this principle rests the authority of the Interstate Commerce Commission, in the execution of the declared policy of the Congress in enforcing reasonable rates, in preventing undue preferences and unjust discriminations, in requiring suitable facilities for transportation in interstate commerce, and in exercising other powers held to have been validly conferred. St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Taylor, 210 U.S. 281, 287 , 28 S.Ct. 616; Inter-Mountain Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 476, 486 , 34 S.Ct. 986; Avent v. United States, 266 U.S. 127, 130 , 45 S.Ct. 34; New York Central Securities Corporation [293 U.S. 388, 428] v. United States, 287 U.S. 12, 24 , 25 S., 53 S.Ct. 45. Upon a similar ground the authority given to the President, in appropriate relation to his functions as Commander-in-Chief, by the Trading with the Enemy Act, as amended by the Act of March 28, 1918 (40 Stat. 460, 12 (50 USCA Appendix 12)), with respect to the disposition of enemy property, was sustained. 'The determination,' said the Court, 'of the terms of sales of enemy properties in the light of facts and conditions from time to time arising in the progress of war was not the making of a law; it was the application of the general rule laid down by the act.' United States v. Chemical Foundation, 272 U.S. 1, 12 , 47 S.Ct. 1, 5.12
The provisions of the Radio Act of 1927 (44 Stat. 1162, 1163), providing for assignments of frequencies or wave lengths to various stations, afford another instance. In granting licenses, the Radio Commission is required to act 'as public convenience, interest, or necessity requires.' Section 4. In construing this provision, the Court found that the statute itself declared the policy as to 'equality of radio broadcasting service, both of transmission and of reception,' and that it conferred authority to make allocations and assignments in order to secure, according to stated criteria, an equitable adjustment in the distribution of facilities. 13 The standard set up was not so indefinite 'as to confer an unlimited power.' Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson Brothers Co., 289 U.S. 266, 279 , 285 S., 53 S.Ct. 627, 634.
So also, from the beginning of the government, the Congress has conferred upon executive officers the power to make regulations-'not for the government of their departments, but for administering the laws which did govern.' United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 517 , 31 S.Ct. 480, 483. Such regulations become, indeed, binding rules of con- [293 U.S. 388, 429] duct, but they are valid only as subordinate rules and when found to be within the framework of the policy which the Legislature has sufficiently defined. In the case of Grimaud, supra, a regulation made by the Secretary of Agriculture requiring permits for grazing sheep on a forest reserve of lands belonging to the United States was involved. The Court referred to the various acts for the establishment and management of forest reservations and the authorization of rules which would 'insure the objects of such reservations,' that is, 'to regulate their occupancy and use, and to preserve the forests thereon from destruction.' The Court observed that 'it was impracticable for Congress to provide general regulations for these various and varying details of management,' and that, in authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture to meet local conditions, Congress 'was merely conferring administrative functions upon an agent, and not delegating to him legislative power.' Id., pages 515, 516 of 220 U. S., 31 S.Ct. 480, 482. The Court quoted with approval the statement of the principle in Field v. Clark, supra, that the Congress cannot delegate legislative power, and upheld the regulation in question as an administrative rule for the appropriate execution of the policy laid down in the statute. See Wayman v. Southard, supra; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U.S. 194, 214 , 215 S., 32 S.Ct. 436; Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 389 , 38 S.Ct. 159, L.R.A. 1918C, 361, Ann.Cas. 1918B, 856; McKinley v. United States, 249 U.S. 397 , 39 S.Ct. 324.
The applicable considerations were reviewed in Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 , 48 S.Ct. 348, 352, where the Court dealt with the so-called 'flexible tariff provision' of the Act of September 21, 1922 (42 Stat. 858, 941, 942, 315 (19 USCA 154-159)), and with the authority which it conferred upon the President. The Court applied the same principle that permitted the Congress to exercise its ratemaking power in interstate commerce, and found that a similar provision was justified for the fixing of customs duties; that is, as the Court said: 'If Congress shall lay down by [293 U.S. 388, 430] legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to fix such rates is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power. If it is thought wise to vary the customs duties according to changing conditions of production at home and abroad, it may authorize the Chief Executive to carry out this purpose, with the advisory assistance of a Tariff Commission appointed under congressional authority.' The Court sustained the provision upon the authority of Field v. Clark, supra, repeating with approval what was there said, that 'What the President was required to do was merely in execution of the act of Congress.' Id., pages 409-411 of 276 U.S., 48 S.Ct. 348, 352.
Thus, in every case in which the question has been raised, the Court has recognized that there are limits of delegation which there is no constitutional authority to transcend. We think that section 9(c) goes beyond those limits. As to the transportation of oil production in excess of state permission, the Congress has declared no policy, has established no standard, has laid down no rule. There is no requirement, no definition of circumstances and conditions in which the transportation is to be allowed or prohibited.
If section 9(c) were held valid, it would be idle to pretend that anything would be left of limitations upon the power of the Congress to delegate its lawmaking function. The reasoning of the many decisions we have reviewed would be made vacuous and their distinctions nugatory. Instead of performing its lawmaking function, the Congress could at will and as to such subjects as it chooses transfer that function to the President or other officer or to an administrative body. The question is not of the intrinsic importance of the particular statute before us, but of the constitutional processes of legislation which are an essential part of our system of government. [293 U.S. 388, 431]
Sixth. There is another objection to the validity of the prohibition laid down by the executive order under section 9(c). The executive order contains no finding, no statement of the grounds of the President's action in enacting the prohibition. Both section 9(c) and the executive order are in notable contrast with historic practice (as shown by many statutes and proclamations we have cited in the margin14) by which declarations of policy are made by the Congress and delegations are within the framework of that policy and have relation to facts and conditions to be found and stated by the President in the appropriate exercise of the delegated authority. If it could be said that from the four corners of the statute any possible inference could be drawn of particular circumstances or conditions which were to govern the exercise of the authority conferred, the President could not act validly without having regard to those circumstances and conditions. And findings by him as to the existence of the required basis of his action would be necessary to sustain that action, for otherwise the case would still be one of an unfettered discretion as the qualification of authority would be ineffectual. The point is pertinent in relation to the first section of the National Industrial Recovery Act. We have said that the first section is but a general introduction, that it declares no policy and defines no standard with respect to the transportation which is the subject of section 9(c). But if from the extremely broad description contained in that section and the widely different matters to which the section refers, it were possible to derive a statement of prerequisites to the President's action under section 9(c), it would still be necessary for the President to comply with those conditions and to show that compliance as the ground of his prohibition. To hold [293 U.S. 388, 432] that he is free to select as he chooses from the many and various objects generally described in the first section, and then to act without making any finding with respect to any object that he does select, and the circumstances properly related to that object, would be in effect to make the conditions inoperative and to invest him with an uncontrolled legislative power.
We are not dealing with action which, appropriately belonging to the executive province, is not the subject of judicial review or with the presumptions attaching to executive action. 15 To repeat, we are concerned with the question of the delegation of legislative power. If the citizen is to be punished for the crime of violating a legislative order of an executive officer, or of a board or commission, due process of law requires that it shall appear that the order is within the authority of the officer, board, or commission, and, if that authority depends on determinations of fact, those determinations must be shown. As the Court said in Wichita Railroad & Light Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 260 U.S. 48, 59 , 43 S.Ct. 51, 55: 'In creating such an administrative agency, the Legislature, to prevent its being a pure delegation of legislative power, must enjoin upon it a certain course of procedure and certain rules of decision in the performance of its function. It is a wholesome and necessary principle that such an agency must pursue the procedure and rules enjoined, and show a substantial compliance therewith to give validity to its action. When, therefore, such an administrative agency is required as a condition precedent to an order, to make a finding of facts, the validity of the order must rest upon the needed finding. If it is lacking, the order is ineffective. [293 U.S. 388, 433] It is pressed on us that the lack of an express finding may be supplied by implication and by reference to the averments of the petition invoking the action of the Commission. We cannot agree to this.' Referring to the ruling in the Wichita Case, the Court said in Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 44 , 44 S.Ct. 283, 288: 'We held that the order in that case, made after a hearing and ordering a reduction, was void for lack of the express finding in the order. We put this conclusion, not only on the language of the statute, but also on general principles of constitutional government.' We cannot regard the President as immune from the application of these constitutional principles. When the President is invested with legislative authority as the delegate of Congress in carrying out a declared policy, he necessarily acts under the constitutional restriction applicable to such a delegation.
We see no escape from the conclusion that the Executive Orders of July 11, 1933, and July 14, 1933, Nos. 6199, 6204 (15 USCA 709 note), and the regulations issued by the Secretary of the Interior thereunder, are without constitutional authority.
The decrees of the Circuit Court of Appeals are reversed, and the causes are remanded to the District Court, with direction to modify its decrees in conformity with this opinion so as to grant permanent injunctions, restraining the defendants from enforcing those orders and regulations.
It is so ordered.
1The full text of the Executive Order of July 11, 1933, is as follows:
'Prohibition of Transportation in Interstate and Foreign Commerce of Petroleum and the Products Thereof Unlawfully Produced or Withdrawn from Storage.
'By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Act of Congress entitled 'An Act To encourage national industrial recovery, to foster fair competition, and to provide for the construction of certain useful public works, and for other purposes,' approved June 16, 1933 (Public No. 67, 73d Congress), the transportation in interstate and foreign commerce of petroleum and the products thereof produced or withdrawn from storage in excess of the amount permitted to be produced or withdrawn from storage by any State law or valid regulation or order prescribed thereunder, by any board, commission, officer, or other duly authorized agency of a State, is hereby prohibited.
'Franklin D. Roosevelt.
'The White House,
'July 11, 1933.'
2The Executive Order of July 14, 1933, is as follows:
'Prohibition of Transportation in Interstate and Foreign Commerce of Petroleum and the Products Thereof Unlawfully Produced or Withdrawn from Storage.
'By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Act of Congress, entitled 'An Act To encourage national industrial recovery, to foster fair competition, and to provide for the construction of certain useful public works, and for other purposes,' approved June 16, 1933 (Public No. 67, 73d Congress), in order to effectuate the intent and purpose of the Congress as expressed in Section 9(c) thereof, and for the purpose of securing the enforcement of my order of July 11, 1933, issued pursuant to said act, I hereby authorize the Secretary of the Interior to exercise all the powers vested in me, for the purpose of enforcing Section 9(c) of said act and said order, including full authority to designate and appoint such agents and to set up such boards and agencies as he may see fit, and to promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary.
'Franklin D. Roosevelt.
'The White House,
'July 14, 1933.'
3The Executive Order of August 19, 1933, is as follows:
'Code of Fair Competition for the Petroleum Industry.
'An application having been duly made, pursuant to and in full compliance with the provisions of Title I of the National Industrial Recovery Act, approved June 16, 1933, for my approval of a Code of Fair Competition for the Petroleum Industry, and hearings having been held thereon and the Administrator having rendered his report together with his recommendations and findings with respect thereto, and the Administrator having found that the said Code of Fair Competition complies in all respects with the pertinent provisions of Title I of said Act and that the requirements of clauses (1) and (2) of subsection (a) of Section 3 of the said Act have been met:
'Now, Therefore, I, Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States, pursuant to the authority vested in me by Title I of the National Industrial Recovery Act, approved June 16, 1933, and otherwise, do adopt and approve the report, recommendations and findings of the Administrator and do order that the said Code of Fair Competition be and it is hereby approved.
'Franklin D. Roosevelt.
'Hugh S. Johnson, Administrator.
'The White House,
'August 19, 1933.'
4The government states that, although the second paragraph of section 4 of article III was a part of the code for a short period prior to September 13, 1933, no legal basis exists for prosecution for production in Texas during that period.
5See United States v. The Schooner Peggy, 1 Cranch, 103, 109, 110; Dinsmore v. Southern Express Co., 183 U.S. 115 ;, 120, 22 S.Ct. 45; Crozier v. Fried Krupp Aktiengesellschaft, 224 U.S. 290, 302 , 32 S.Ct. 488; Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe R. Co. v. Dennis, 224 U.S. 503, 507 , 32 S.Ct. 542; Watts, Watts & Co. v. Unione Austriaca, 248 U.S. 9, 21 , 39 S.Ct. 1, 3 A.L.R. 323; Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 464 , 41 S.Ct. 172, 16 A.L.R. 196; American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Council, 257 U.S. 184, 201 , 42 S.Ct. 72, 27 A.L.R. 360; Texas Company v. Brown, 258 U.S. 466, 474 , 42 S.Ct. 375.
6The text of section 1 is as follows:
'Section 1. A national emergency productive of widespread unemployment and disorganization of industry, which burdens interstate and foreign commerce, affects the public welfare, and undermines the standards of living of the American people, is hereby declared to exist. It is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress to remove obstructions to the free flow of interstate and foreign commerce which tend to diminish the amount thereof; and to provide for the general welfare by promoting the organization of industry for the purpose of cooperative action among trade groups, to induce and maintain united action of labor and management under adequate governmental sanctions and supervision, to eliminate unfair competitive practices, to promote the fullest possible utilization of the present productive capacity of industries, to avoid undue restriction of production (except as may be temporarily required), to increase the consumption of industrial and agricultural products by increasing purchasing power, to reduce and relieve unemployment, to improve standards of labor, and otherwise to rehabilitate industry and to conserve natural resources.'
7Acts of June 4, 1794, 1 Stat. 372; March 3, 1795, 1 Stat. 444; June 13, 1798, 1 Stat. 565, 566; February 9, 1799, 1 Stat. 613, 615; February 27, 1800, 2 Stat. 7, 9, 10; March 3, 1805, 2 Stat. 339, 341, 342; February 28, 1806, 2 Stat. 351, 352; April 22, 1808, 2 Stat. 490.
8Marshall's Life of Washington, vol. 2, p. 319 et seq.
9Thus, prior to the Act of June 4, 1794 (1 Stat. 372), the Congress had laid embargoes, for limited periods, upon vessels in ports of the United States bound to foreign ports. Resolutions of March 26, 1794, and April 18, 1794, 1 Stat. 400, 401. Fearing that the national safety might be endangered, the President, by the Act of June 4, 1794, was authorized to lay an embargo, with appropriate regulations, whenever he found that 'the public safety shall so require' (section 1), the authority not to be exercised while the Congress was in session and the embargo to be limited in any case to 15 days after the commencement of the next session. The Act of March 3, 1795 (1 Stat. 444), authorizing the President to permit the exportation of arms, etc., was 'in cases connected with the security of the commercial interest of the United States, and for public purposes only.' By the Act of June 13, 1798 (1 Stat. 565), commercial intercourse was suspended between the United States and France and its dependencies. The act was to continue only until the end of the next session of Congress, and it was provided (section 5) that if, before the next session, the government of France 'shall clearly disavow, and shall be found to refrain from the aggressions, depredations and hostilities' against the vessels and other property of citizens of the United States, and shall acknowledge the neutrality of the United States, 'it shall be lawful for the President,' 'being well ascertained of the premises,' to remit and discontinue the prohibitions and restraints imposed by the act and to make proclamation accordingly. (continued on p. 423)
The Act of February 9, 1799 (1 Stat. 613), further suspended commercial intercourse between the United States and France and its dependencies until March 3, 1800, and gave a similar authority (section 4) to the President to remit and discontinue the restraints and prohibitions of the act, 'if he shall deem it expedient and consistent with the interest of the United States,' either with respect to the French Republic or to any place belonging to that republic, 'with which a commercial intercourse may safely be renewed,' and to revoke such order if he found that the interest of the United States so required. The suspension of commercial intercourse was renewed by the Act of February 27, 1800 (2 Stat. 7) until March 3, 1801, with a similar provision as to the authority of the President. The Act of March 3, 1805 (2 Stat. 339), related to persons committing treason, felony, etc., within the jurisdiction of the United States and taking refuge in foreign armed vessels, and the authority to the President to permit or prevent the entry of such vessels into the waters of the United States (section 4) was 'in order to prevent insults to the authority of the laws, whereby the peace of the United States with foreign nations may be endangered.' See, also, Act of April 22, 1808, 2 Stat. 490. See, also, Proclamations of President Adams, 'Works of John Adams,' vol. IX, pp. 176, 177.
10See Act of June 28, 1809, 2 Stat. 550.
11Acts of March 3, 1815, 3 Stat. 224; March 3, 1817, 3 Stat. 361; January 7, 1824, 4 Stat. 2; May 24, 1828, 4 Stat. 308; May 31, 1830, 4 Stat. 425; March 6, 1866, 14 Stat. 3; March 3, 1883, 22 Stat. 490; June 26, 1884, 23 Stat. 57; October 1, 1890, 26 Stat. 616; R.S. 2493, 2494, 4219, 4228. Proclamations of Presidents: 3 Stat.App. 1; 4 Stat.App. 3, pp. 814- 818; 9 Stat.App. 1001, 1004; 11 Stat.App. 795; 13 Stat.App. 739; 14 Stat. App. 818, 819; 16 Stat.App. 1127; 17 Stat.App. 954, 956, 957; 21 Stat. 800; 23 Stat. 841, 842, 844.
For other analogous statutes, see Acts of December 17, 1813, 3 Stat. 88, 93; June 19, 1886, 24 Stat. 79, 82 (section 17 (46 USCA 142)); March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 475 (46 USCA 143); August 30, 1890, 26 Stat. 414, 415 ( sections 4, 5 (21 USCA 18; 19 USCA 181)); February 15, 1893, 27 Stat. 449, 452 (section 7 (42 USCA 111)); March 2, 1895, 28 Stat. 727, 733; September 8, 1916, 39 Stat. 756, 799 (15 USCA 75-77); June 15, 1917, 40 Stat. 217, 225; August 10, 1917, 40 Stat. 276; October 6, 1917, 40 Stat. 411, 422 (section 11 (50 USCA Appendix, 11)); March 4, 1919, 40 Stat. 1348, 1350; June 17, 1930, 46 Stat. 590, 704 (section 338 (19 USCA 1338 )). Resolutions of March 14, 1912, 37 Stat. 630; January 31, 1922, 42 Stat. 361 (22 USCA 236, 237). Proclamations: 24 Stat. 1024, 1025, 1028, 1030; 27 Stat. 995, 1011; 38 Stat. 1960; 39 Stat. 1756; 40 Stat. 1683, 1689, et seq.
12See, also, sections 4(b) and 5(a) of the Trading with the Enemy Act, 40 Stat. 411, 414, 415, 50 USCA Appendix 4(b), 5(a).
13Act of March 28, 1928, 5 (amending section 9 of the Radio Act of 1927) 45 Stat. 373.
14See Acts and Proclamations cited in note 11, supra.
15See Philadelphia & T.R.R. Co. v. Stimpson, 14 Pet. 448, 458; Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 19, 30, 32; Dakota Central Telephone Co. v. South Dakota, 250 U.S. 163, 182 , 184 S., 39 S.Ct. 507, 4 A.L.R. 1623; United States v. Chemical Foundation, 272 U.S. 1, 14 , 15 S., 47 S.Ct. 1; Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 399 , 53 S.Ct. 190.
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