Raymond Motor Transportation, Inc. v. Rice
434 U.S. 429 (1978).
MR. JUSTICE POWELL
delivered the opinion of the Court. [footnotes
omitted]
We consider on this appeal whether administrative
regulations of the State of Wisconsin governing the length and configuration of
trucks that may be operated within the State violate the Commerce Clause
because they unconstitutionally burden or discriminate against interstate
commerce. The three-judge District Court held that the regulations are not
unconstitutional on either ground. Because we conclude that they
unconstitutionally burden interstate commerce, we reverse.
I
Appellant Raymond Motor Transportation, Inc. (Raymond), a
Minnesota corporation with its principal place of business in [434 U.S. 429,
431] Minneapolis, is a common carrier
of general commodities by motor vehicle. Operating pursuant to a certificate of
public convenience and necessity granted by the Interstate Commerce Commission,
see 49 U.S.C. 306-308, Raymond provides service in eastern North Dakota,
Minnesota, northern Illinois, and northwestern Indiana. Its primary interstate
route is between Chicago and Minneapolis. It does not serve any points in
Wisconsin.
Appellant Consolidated Freightways Corporation of Delaware
(Consolidated), a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in
Menlo Park, Cal., also is a common carrier of general commodities by motor
vehicle. Consolidated operates nationwide, providing service under a
certificate of public convenience and necessity in 42 States and Canada. Among
other routes, Consolidated carries commodities between Chicago, Detroit, and
points east, and Minneapolis and points west to Seattle. Unlike Raymond,
Consolidated does carry commodities between Wisconsin and other States, and it
maintains terminals in Milwaukee and Madison where truckloads of goods are
dispatched and received.
Both Raymond and Consolidated use two different kinds of
trucks. One consists of a three-axle power unit (tractor) which pulls a single
two-axle trailer that is 40 feet long. The overall length of such a
single-trailer unit (single) is 55 feet. This unit has been used on the
Nation's highways for many years and is an industry standard. The other type
truck consists of a two-axle tractor which pulls a single-axle trailer to which
a single-axle dolly and a second single-axle trailer are attached. Each trailer
is 27 feet long, and the overall length of such a double-trailer unit (double)
is 65 feet.1
The double, which has come into increasing use in recent
years, is thought to have certain advantages over the single [434 U.S. 429,
432] for general commodities shipping.2
Because of these advantages, Raymond would prefer to use doubles on its route
between Chicago and Minneapolis. Consolidated would prefer to use doubles on
its routes between Chicago, Detroit, and points east, and Minneapolis and
points west, as well as on its routes commencing and ending in Milwaukee and
Madison. The most direct route for all of this traffic is over Interstate
Highways 90 and 94, both of which cross Wisconsin between Illinois and
Minnesota. State law allows 65-foot doubles to be operated on interstate
highways and access roads in Michigan, Illinois, Minnesota, and all of the
States west from Minnesota to Washington through which Interstate Highways 90
and 94 run.
Wisconsin law, however, generally does not allow trucks
longer than 55 feet to be operated on highways within that State. The key
statutory provision is Wis. Stat. 348.07 (1) (1975), which sets a limit of 55
feet on the overall length of a vehicle pulling one trailer.3 Any
person operating a single-trailer unit of greater length must obtain a permit
issued by the State Highway Commission. In addition, 348.08 (1) [434 U.S. 429,
433] provides that no vehicle pulling
more than one other vehicle shall be operated on a highway without a permit. 4
The Commission is authorized to issue various classes of
annual permits for the operation of vehicles that do not conform to the above
requirements. In particular, it may issue "trailer train" permits for
the operation of combinations of more than two vehicles "consisting of
truck tractors, trailers, semitrailers or wagons which do not exceed a total
length of 100 feet," 348.27 (6). 5 The Commission may also
"impose [434 U.S. 429, 434] such
reasonable conditions" and "adopt such reasonable rules" of
operation with respect to vehicles operated under permit "as it deems
necessary for the safety of travel and protection of the highways," 348.25
(3), including specification of the routes to be used by permittees.
The Commission has issued administrative regulations setting
forth the conditions under which "trailer train" and other classes of
permits will be issued. Although the Commission is empowered by 348.27 (6) to
issue "trailer train" permits to operate double-trailer trucks up to
100 feet long, its regulations restrict such permits to "the operation of
vehicles used for the transporting of municipal refuse or waste, or for the
interstate or intra-state operation without load of vehicles in transit from
manufacturer or dealer to purchaser or dealer, or for the purpose of
repair." Wis. Admin. Code Hy 30.14 (3) (a) (July
1975). "Trailer train" permits also are issued "for the
operation of a combination of three vehicles used for the transporting of milk
from the point of production to the point of first processing," Hy 30.18 (3) (a) (June 1976).
II
The overture to this lawsuit began when Raymond and
Consolidated each applied to the appropriate Wisconsin [434 U.S. 429, 435] officials under 348.27 (6) for annual permits
to operate 65-foot doubles on Interstate Highways 90 and 94 between Illinois
and Minnesota and, in Consolidated's case, on short
stretches of four-lane divided highways between the interstate highways and
freight terminals in Milwaukee and Madison. 6 The permits were
denied because appellants' proposed operations were not within the narrow scope
of the administrative regulations that specify when "trailer train"
permits will be issued. Appellants then filed suit in Federal District Court
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on the ground that the regulations
barring the proposed operation of 65-foot doubles burden and discriminate
against interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause, Art. I, 8, cl. 3. 7 The complaint alleged that the
State's refusal to issue the requested permits disrupts and delays appellants'
transportation of commodities in interstate commerce; that 65-foot doubles are
as safe as, if not safer than, the 55-foot singles that are allowed to operate
on Wisconsin highways without permits; and that the maze of statutory and
administrative exceptions to the general prohibition against operating vehicles
longer than 55 feet results in "`over-length' permits [being] routinely
granted to classes of vehicles indistinguishable from those of the Plaintiffs
in terms of size, safety, and divisibility of loads . . . ." App. 18.
A three-judge District Court was convened pursuant to [434
U.S. 429, 436] 28 U.S.C. 2281. 8
After a pretrial conference, the court directed the State to file an amended
answer setting forth every justification for its refusal to issue the permits
sought, "such as safety, for example." App. 25.
The State's amended answer advanced highway safety as its sole justification.
Id., at 27-29. By agreement of the parties, the case was tried on affidavits,
depositions, and exhibits.
Appellants presented a great deal of evidence supporting
their allegation that 65-foot doubles are as safe as, if not safer than,
55-foot singles when operated on limited-access, four-lane divided highways.
For example, the Deputy Director of the Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety, Federal
Highway Administration, United States Department of Transportation, testified
on deposition that the Bureau's five-year study of the accident experience of
selected motor carriers that use both types of trucks showed that doubles are
safer than singles in terms of the number of accidents, injuries, and
fatalities per 100,000 miles, and in terms of the amount of property damage and
number of injuries and fatalities per accident. The deponent's own expert
opinion was that doubles are safer because of the articulation between the
first and second trailers, which allows greater maneuverability and prevents
the back wheels of the second trailer from deviating from the path of the front
wheels of the tractor (offtracking) as much as the
back wheels of a 55-foot single; because loads typically are distributed more
evenly in doubles than in singles; and because doubles typically have better
braking capability than singles.
Other experts testified that 65-foot doubles brake as well as 55-foot singles, maneuver and track better, are less prone to jackknife, and produce less splash and spray to obscure the vision of drivers in following and passing vehicles. These [434 U.S. 429, 437] experts agreed that the difference in the amount of time needed to pass a 55-foot single and a 65-foot double has no appreciable effect on motorist safety on limited-access, four-lane divided highways. Appellants also produced depositions and affidavits of state highway safety officials from 12 of the State where 65-foot doubles are allowed on some or all highways; all shared the opinion that 65-foot doubles are as safe as 55-foot singles. 9
The State, for reasons unexplained, made no effort to
contradict this evidence of comparative safety with
evidence of its own. 10 The Chairman of the State Highway
Commission, while acknowledging the Commission's statutory authority to issue
the permits sought by appellants, testified that the regulations preventing
their issuance are not based on an administrative assessment of the safety of
65-foot doubles, and he himself was "not prepared to make a statement
relative to the safety of these vehicles." App. 250.
The reason for the Commission's adoption of these regulations, according to the
Chairman, was its belief that the people of the State did not want more
vehicles over 55 feet long on the State's highways. 11 The [434 U.S.
429, 438] State produced no evidence,
nor has it made any suggestion in this Court, that 65-foot doubles are less
safe than 55-foot singles because of their extra trailer, as distinguished from
their extra length. 12
Appellants also produced uncontradicted
evidence showing that their operations are disrupted, their costs are raised,
and their service is slowed by the challenged regulations. For example,
Consolidated ordinarily finds it faster and less expensive to use 65-foot
doubles to carry interstate freight originating from or destined for Milwaukee
and Madison. To comply with Wisconsin law, however, an interstate double bound
for Wisconsin must stop before entering the State and detach one of its two
trailers. Consolidated then pulls each trailer separately to the freight
terminal in Milwaukee or Madison. Likewise, each trailer of a double outbound
from one of those cities must be pulled across the Wisconsin state line
separately, at which point they are united into a double-trailer combination.
Consolidated maintains a crew of drivers in Wisconsin whose sole responsibility
is to shuttle second trailers to and from the state line.
On routes through Wisconsin between Chicago and Minneapolis,
both Consolidated and Raymond are compelled to use 55-foot singles instead of
65-foot doubles because each trailer of a double would have to be pulled by a
separate tractor on the portion of the route that is in Wisconsin. On its long
east-west routes from Detroit and Chicago to Seattle, Consolidated must divert
doubles south of Wisconsin through Missouri and Nebraska in order to avoid Wisconsin's
ban. 13 [434 U.S. 429,
439] These
routes would involve a considerably shorter distance if Consolidated's
trucks could go through Wisconsin. 14
Finally, appellants' evidence demonstrated that Wisconsin
routinely allows a great number and variety of vehicles over 55 feet long to be
operated on the State's highways. App. 178-181.
The three-judge court ruled against appellants. 417 F. Supp. 1352 (WD Wis. 1976) (per curiam).
The court found that the Wisconsin regulatory scheme does not discriminate
against interstate commerce. Id., at 1356-1358. The court also considered
"whether the burden imposed upon interstate commerce outweighs the
benefits to the local popul[ace]," id., at 1358, and concluded that it did not. It
thought that appellants had not shown that the State's refusal to issue permits
for appellants' 65-foot doubles had no relation to highway safety, pointing to
the fact that, other things being equal, it takes longer for a motorist to pass
a 65-foot truck than a 55-foot truck. Id., at 1359.
The court considered the expense imposed on appellants to be "of no
material consequence." Id., at 1361. We noted
probable jurisdiction. 430 U.S. 914 (1977).
III
Appellants challenge both branches of the District Court's
holding. First, they contend that the State's refusal to issue the requested
"trailer train" permits under 348.27 (6) burdens interstate commerce
in violation of the Commerce Clause because it substantially interferes with
the movement of goods in interstate commerce and makes no contribution to
highway [434 U.S. 429, 440] safety.
Second, they argue that 348.27 (4), authorizing issuance of
"interplant" permits, see n. 5, supra,
discriminates against interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause
because it allows permits to be issued to carry the products of Wisconsin
industries, but not of other States' industries, over Wisconsin highways in
trucks longer than 55 feet. We find it necessary to address the second
contention only as it bears on the first.
By its terms, the Commerce Clause grants Congress the power
"[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several States . . . ." Long
ago it was settled that even in the absence of a congressional exercise of this
power, the Commerce Clause prevents the States from erecting barriers to the
free flow of interstate commerce. Cooley
v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299 (1852); see Great A&P Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 370 -371 (1976).
At the same time, however, it never has been doubted that much state legislation,
designed to serve legitimate state interests and applied without discrimination
against interstate commerce, does not violate the Commerce Clause even though
it affects commerce. H. P. Hood &
Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 531 -532
(1949); see Gibbons v. Ogden, 9
Wheat. 1, 203-206 (1824); id., at 235 (Johnson, J., concurring). "[I]n
areas where activities of legitimate local concern overlap with the national
interests expressed by the Commerce Clause - where local and national powers
are concurrent - the Court in the absence of congressional guidance is called
upon to make `delicate adjustment of the conflicting state and federal claims,'
H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, supra, at 553 (Black, J., dissenting) . . .
." Great A&P Tea Co. v. Cottrell,
supra, at 371; see Hunt v. Washington
Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350
(1977).
In this process of "delicate adjustment," the
Court has employed various tests to express the distinction between permissible
and impermissible impact upon interstate commerce, 15 [434 U.S. 429, 441] but experience teaches that no single
conceptual approach identifies all of the factors that may bear on a particular
case. 16 Our recent decisions make clear that the inquiry
necessarily involves a sensitive consideration of the weight and nature of the
state regulatory concern in light of the extent of the burden imposed on the
course of interstate commerce. As the Court stated in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970):
"Although the
criteria for determining the validity of state statutes affecting interstate
commerce have been variously stated, the general rule that emerges can be
phrased as follows: Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are
only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce
is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. Huron Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 , 443. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the
question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be
tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved,
and on whether it [434 U.S. 429, 442] could
be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities."
Accord, Great A&P
Tea Co. v. Cottrell, supra, at 371-372; Hughes
v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 804 (1976); see also Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, supra, at 350.
In the instant case, appellants do not dispute that a State
has a legitimate interest in regulating motor vehicles using its roads in order
to promote highway safety. Nor do they contend that federal regulation has
pre-empted state regulation of truck length or configuration. 17
They argue, however, that the burden imposed upon interstate commerce by the
Wisconsin regulations challenged here is, in the language of Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,
"clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits."
Appellants contend that the regulations were shown by uncontradicted
evidence to make no contribution to highway safety, while imposing a burden on
interstate commerce that is substantial in terms of expense and delay. They
analogize this case to Bibb v. Navajo
Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959), where the Court invalidated an Illinois
law, defended on the ground that it promoted highway safety, that required
trailers of trucks driven within Illinois to be equipped with contour
mudguards.
The State replies that the general rule of Pike is not
applicable to a State's regulation of motor vehicles in the promotion of
safety. It contends that we should be guided, instead, by South Carolina Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177
(1938), which upheld over Commerce Clause objections a state law that set
stricter limitations on truck width and weight than did surrounding States'
laws. The State [434 U.S. 429, 443]
emphasizes that Barnwell Bros.
applied a "rational relation" test rather than a
"balancing" test, and argues that its regulations bear a rational
relation to highway safety: Longer trucks take longer to pass or be passed than
shorter trucks.
We acknowledge, as did the Court in Bibb, that there is language in Barnwell
Bros. "which, read in isolation from . . . later decisions . . .,
would suggest that no showing of burden on interstate commerce is sufficient to
invalidate local safety regulations in absence of some element of
discrimination against interstate commerce." 359 U.S.,
at 528 -529. But Bibb rejected
such a suggestion by stating the test to be applied to state highway regulation
in terms similar in principle to the subsequent formulation in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.:
"Unless we can conclude on the whole record that `the total effect
of the law as a safety measure in reducing accidents and casualties is so
slight or problematical as not to outweigh the national interest in keeping
interstate commerce free from interferences which seriously impede it' . . . we
must uphold the statute." 359 U.S., at 524 ,
quoting Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona
ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 775 -776 (1945).
Thus, we cannot accept the State's contention that the
inquiry under the Commerce Clause is ended without a weighing of the asserted
safety purpose against the degree of interference with interstate commerce.
Nevertheless, it also is true that the Court has been most
reluctant to invalidate under the Commerce Clause "`state legislation in
the field of safety where the propriety of local regulation has long been
recognized.'" Pike
v. Bruce Church, Inc., supra, at 143, quoting Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, supra, at 796
(Douglas, J., dissenting). In no field has this deference to state
regulation been greater than that of highway safety regulation. See, e. g., Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610 (1915); Sproles v. Binford,
286 U.S. [434 U.S. 429, 444] 374
(1932); Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S.
598 (1940); Railway Express Agency, Inc.
v. New York, 336 U.S. 106
(1949). 18 Thus, those who would challenge state
regulations said to promote highway safety must overcome a "strong
presumption of [their] validity." Bibb, supra, at 524.
Despite the strength of this presumption, we are persuaded
by the record in this case that the challenged regulations unconstitutionally
burden interstate commerce. As we have shown, appellants produced a massive
array of evidence to disprove the State's assertion that the regulations make
some contribution to highway safety. The State, for its part, virtually
defaulted in its defense of the regulations as a safety measure. Both it and
the District Court were content to assume that the regulations contribute to
highway safety because appellants' 65-foot doubles take longer to pass or be
passed than the 55-foot singles. Yet appellants produced uncontradicted
evidence that the difference in passing time does not pose an appreciable
threat to motorists traveling on limited access, four-lane divided highways. 19
They also [434 U.S. 429, 445] showed
that the Highway Commission routinely allows many other vehicles 55 feet or
longer to use the State's highways. In short, the State's assertion that the
challenged regulations contribute to highway safety is rebutted by appellants'
evidence and undercut by the maze of exemptions from the general truck-length
limit that the State itself allows. 20
Moreover, appellants demonstrated, again without
contradiction, that the regulations impose a substantial burden on the
interstate movement of goods. The regulations substantially increase the cost
of such movement, a fact which is not, as the District Court thought, entirely
irrelevant. 21 In addition, the regulations slow the movement of
goods in interstate commerce by forcing appellants to haul doubles across the
State separately, to haul doubles around the State altogether, or to incur the
delays caused by using singles instead of doubles to pick up and deliver goods.
See Bibb, 359 U.S., at 527 . Finally, the regulations prevent appellants from
accepting interline transfers of 65-foot doubles for movement through Wisconsin
from carriers that operate only in the 33 States where the doubles are legal.
See id., at 527-528. 22 In
our [434 U.S. 429, 446] view, the
burden imposed on interstate commerce by Wisconsin's regulations is no less
than that imposed by the statute invalidated in Bibb. 23
One other consideration, although not decisive, lends force
to our conclusion that the challenged regulations cannot stand. As we have
noted, Wisconsin's regulatory scheme contains a great number of exceptions to
the general rule that vehicles over 55 feet long cannot be operated on highways
within the State. At least one of these exceptions discriminates on its face in
favor of Wisconsin industries and against the industries of other States,
24 and there are indications in the record that a [434 U.S. 429,
447] number of the other exceptions,
although neutral on their face, were enacted at the instance of, and primarily
benefit, important Wisconsin industries. Viewed realistically, these exceptions
may be the product of compromise between forces within the State that seek to
retain the State's general truck-length limit, and industries within the State
that complain that the general limit is unduly burdensome. Exemptions of this
kind, however, weaken the presumption in favor of the validity of the general
limit, because they undermine the assumption that the State's own political
processes will act as a check on local regulations that unduly burden
interstate commerce. See n. 18, supra.
IV
On this record, we are persuaded that the challenged
regulations violate the Commerce Clause because they place a substantial burden
on interstate commerce and they cannot be said to make more than the most
speculative contribution to highway safety. Our holding is a narrow one, for we
do not decide whether laws of other States restricting the operation of trucks
over 55 feet long, or of double-trailer trucks, would be upheld if the evidence
produced on the safety issue were not so overwhelmingly one-sided as in this
case. 25 The State of [434 U.S. 429, 448] Wisconsin has failed to make even a
colorable showing that its regulations contribute to highway safety. The
judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
MR. JUSTICE STEVENS
took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN,
with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, and MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST
join, concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court, but I add these comments to
emphasize the narrow scope of today's decision.
First, the Court's reliance on Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970), does not signal,
for me, a new approach to review of state highway safety regulations under the
Commerce Clause. Wisconsin argues that the Court previously has refused to
balance safety considerations against burdens on interstate commerce. Brief for Appellees 8. This contention misreads Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S.
520 (1959), which recognized the Court's responsibility to weigh the national
interest in free-flowing commerce against "`slight or problematical'"
safety interests. Id.,
at 524, quoting Southern Pacific Co. v.
Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 776 (1945).
Second, the reliance on Pike
should not be read to equate the factual balance struck here with the balance
established in Pike regarding the
Arizona Fruit and Vegetable Standardization Act. Arizona
prohibited interstate shipment of cantaloupes [434 U.S. 429, 449] not "packed in regular compact
arrangement in closed standard containers." 397 U.S., at 138 , quoting Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 3-503C (Supp. 1969).
Application of the prohibition to the appellee grower would have prevented it
from processing its cantaloupes just across the state line in California, and
would have required it to construct a packing facility in Arizona. The State
attempted to justify this burden on interstate commerce solely by its interest
"to promote and preserve the reputation of Arizona growers by prohibiting
deceptive packaging." 397 U.S., at 143 . More
specifically, Arizona wanted the appellee to package the cantaloupes in the
State so that the high-quality fruit could be advertised as grown in Arizona
rather than California. Although recognizing the legitimacy of the State's
interest, the Court refused to accord the concern much weight in the Commerce
Clause balancing:
"[T]he State's tenuous interest in having the company's cantaloupes
identified as originating in Arizona cannot constitutionally justify the
requirement that the company build and operate an unneeded $200,000 packing
plant in the State." Id.,
at 145.
In short, despite the unchallenged existence and legitimacy
of the State's interest, the Court determined that the interest was not
important enough to justify the burden on commerce.
Neither the Pike opinion
nor today's decision suggests that a similar balance would be struck when a
State legitimately asserts the existence of a safety justification for a
regulation. In Pike itself the Court
noted that it did not confront "`state legislation in the field of safety
where the propriety of local regulation has long been recognized.'" Id., at 143, quoting Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel.
Sullivan, 325 U.S., at 796 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). In other words, if safety justifications are not
illusory, the Court will not second-guess legislative judgment about their
importance in comparison with related burdens on interstate commerce. I
therefore join [434 U.S. 429, 450] the
opinion of the Court because its ultimate balancing does not depart from this
principle, as stated in Bibb v. Navajo
Freight Lines:
"These safety measures carry a strong presumption of validity when challenged in court. If there are alternative ways of solving a problem, we do not sit to determine which of them is best suited to achieve a valid state objective. Policy decisions are for the state legislature, absent federal entry into the field." 359 U.S., at 524 .
Here, the Court does not engage in a balance of policies; it
does not make a legislative choice. Instead, after searching the factual record
developed by the parties, it concludes that the safety interests have not been
shown to exist as a matter of law.
Third, the illusory nature of the safety interests in this
case is illustrated not only by the overwhelming empirical data submitted by
the appellants, but also by the State's willingness to permit the use of
oversized vehicles under the numerous administrative exceptions for in-state
manufacturers and important Wisconsin industries. See ante, at 433-434, nn. 4-5, and 446-447.
From 1973 through June 1975, the State issued 43,900 annual or general permits
for the use of vehicles longer than 65 feet. Brief of Plaintiffs before the
District Court in Case No. 75-C-172, App. C, 10-11. An additional 16,760
single-trip permits were granted during the same period. Id.,
at 11. Despite the alleged safety problems, the State regularly
permitted the use of oversized vehicles merely to lower the cost of
transportation for in-state industries. The bulkiness of the cargoes frequently
did not justify the permits. See Deposition of Robert T. Huber, Chairman of the
Wisconsin State Highway Commission, 7-9, 21; Deposition of Wayne Volk, Chief
Traffic Engineer, Wisconsin Department of Transportation, 31, 36, 49-50, 53.
American Motors, one of the State's largest employers, received permission to
use oversized trucks on the 45-mile stretch of highway between Milwaukee [434
U.S. 429, 451] and Kenosha, even though
the State's Chief Traffic Engineer conceded that the road was heavily traveled.
Deposition of Wayne Volk, supra,
at 32. Furthermore, Stoughton Body Co., a Wisconsin manufacturer of
trailers, received permits to pull oversized, double-trailer vehicles on a
two-lane highway to facilitate out-of-state deliveries. Id., at 52-54. The
record therefore suggests that the State in practice does not believe that
oversized, double-trailer vehicles present a threat to highway safety.
Nineteen years after Bibb, then, the Court has been presented with another of those cases—"few in number"—in which highway safety regulations unconstitutionally burden interstate commerce. See 359 U.S., at 529 . The contour-mudflaps law burdened the flow of commerce through Illinois in 1959 just as the length and configuration regulations burden the flow through Wisconsin today. It was shown that neither the mudflaps law nor the regulations contributed to highway safety. Giving the same legislative leeway to Wisconsin that the Court gave to Illinois, Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines requires reversal of the judgment of the District Court. [434 U.S. 429, 452]