MATAL, INTERIM DIRECTOR, UNITED
STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE v. TAM
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
Argued January 18, 2017—Decided
June 19, 2017
Simon Tam,
lead singer of the rock group “The Slants,” chose this moniker in order to “reclaim” the term and drain its denigrating
force as a derogatory term for Asian persons. Tam sought federal registration
of the mark “THE SLANTS.” The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) denied the
application under a Lanham Act provision prohibiting the registration of
trademarks that may “disparage . . . or bring . . . into contemp[t]
or disrepute” any “persons, living or dead.” 15 U. S. C. §1052(a). Tam
contested the denial of registration through the administrative appeals
process, to no avail. He then took the case to federal court, where the en banc Federal Circuit ultimately found
the disparagement clause facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment’s
Free Speech Clause.
Held: The
judgment is affirmed. 808 F. 3d 1321, affirmed.
JUSTICE
ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, and
III–A, concluding:
1. The
disparagement clause applies to marks that disparage the members of a racial or
ethnic group. Tam’s view, that the clause applies only to natural or juristic
persons, is refuted by the plain terms of the clause, which uses the word
“persons.” A mark that disparages a “substantial” percentage of the members of
a racial or ethnic group necessarily disparages many “persons,” namely, members
of that group. Tam’s narrow reading also clashes with the breadth of the
disparagement clause, which by its terms applies not just to “persons,” but
also to “institutions” and “beliefs.” §1052(a). Had Congress wanted to confine
the reach of the clause, it could have used the phrase “particular living
individual,” which it used in neighboring §1052(c). Tam contends that his
interpretation is supported by legislative history and by the PTO’s practice
for many years of registering marks that plainly denigrated certain groups. But
an inquiry into the meaning of the statute’s text ceases when, as here, “the
statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and
consistent.” Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U. S. 438, 450 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Even if resort to legislative history and early enforcement
practice were appropriate, Tam has presented nothing showing a congressional
intent to adopt his interpretation, and the PTO’s practice in the years
following the disparagement clause’s enactment is unenlightening. Pp. 8–12.
2. The
disparagement clause violates the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause.
Contrary to the Government’s contention, trademarks are private, not government
speech. Because the “Free Speech Clause . . . does not regulate government
speech,” Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U. S. 460, 467, the government is not
required to maintain viewpoint neutrality on its own speech. This Court
exercises great caution in extending its government-speech precedents, for if
private speech could be passed off as government speech by simply affixing a
government seal of approval, government could silence or muffle the expression
of disfavored viewpoints. The Federal Government does not dream up the
trademarks registered by the PTO. Except as required by §1052(a), an examiner
may not reject a mark based on the viewpoint that it appears to express. If the
mark meets the Lanham Act’s viewpoint-neutral requirements, registration is
mandatory. And once a mark is registered, the PTO is not authorized to remove
it from the register unless a party moves for cancellation, the registration
expires, or the Federal Trade Commission initiates proceedings based on certain
grounds. It is thus farfetched to suggest that the content of a registered mark
is government speech, especially given the fact that if trademarks become
government speech when they are registered, the Federal Government is babbling
prodigiously and incoherently. And none of this Court’s government-speech cases
supports the idea that registered trademarks are government speech. Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Assn., 544 U. S.
550; Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U. S. 460; and Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 576 U. S.
___, distinguished. Holding that the registration of a trademark converts the
mark into government speech would constitute a huge and dangerous extension of
the government-speech doctrine, for other systems of government registration
(such as copyright) could easily be characterized in the same way. Pp. 12–18.
JUSTICE ALITO, joined by THE CHIEF
JUSTICE, JUSTICE THOMAS, and JUSTICE BREYER, concluded in Parts III–B, III–C, and IV:
(a) The
Government’s argument that this case is governed by the Court’s
subsidized-speech cases is unpersuasive. Those cases all involved cash
subsidies or their equivalent, e.g., funds to private parties for family
planning services in Rust v. Sullivan,
500 U. S. 173, and cash grants to artists in National Endowment for Arts v. Finley, 524 U. S. 569. The federal
registration of a trademark is nothing like these programs. The PTO does not
pay money to parties seeking registration of a mark; it requires the payment of
fees to file an application and to maintain the registration once it is
granted. The Government responds that registration provides valuable
non-monetary benefits traceable to the Government’s resources devoted to
registering the marks, but nearly every government service requires the
expenditure of government funds. This is true of services that benefit
everyone, like police and fire protection, as well as services that are
utilized by only some, e.g., the adjudication of private lawsuits and the use
of public parks and highways. Pp. 18–20.
(b) Also
unpersuasive is the Government’s claim that the disparagement clause is
constitutional under a “government-program” doctrine, an argument which is
based on a merger of this Court’s government-speech cases and subsidy cases. It
points to two cases involving a public employer’s collection of union dues from
its employees, Davenport v. Washington
Ed. Assn., 551 U. S. 177, and Ysursa v. Pocatello
Ed. Assn., 555 U. S. 353, but these cases occupy a special area of First
Amendment case law that is far removed from the registration of trademarks.
Cases in which government creates a limited public forum for private speech,
thus allowing for some content- and speaker-based restrictions, see, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Central School,
533 U. S. 98, 106–107; Rosenberger v.
Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819, 831, are potentially
more analogous. But even in those cases, viewpoint discrimination is forbidden.
The disparagement clause denies registration to any mark that is offensive to a
substantial percentage of the members of any group. That is viewpoint
discrimination in the sense relevant here: Giving offense is a viewpoint. The
“public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are
themselves offensive to some of their hearers.” Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576, 592. Pp. 20–23.
(c) The
dispute between the parties over whether trademarks are commercial speech
subject to the relaxed scrutiny outlined in Central
Hudson Gas & Elect. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N. Y., 447 U. S. 557,
need not be resolved here because the disparagement clause cannot withstand
even Central Hudson review. Under Central Hudson, a restriction of speech
must serve “a substantial interest” and be “narrowly drawn.” Id., at 564–565
(internal quotation marks omitted). One purported interest is in preventing
speech expressing ideas that offend, but that idea strikes at the heart of the
First Amendment. The second interest asserted is protecting the orderly flow of
commerce from disruption caused by trademarks that support invidious
discrimination; but the clause, which reaches any trademark that disparages any
person, group, or institution, is not narrowly drawn. Pp. 23–26.
JUSTICE KENNEDY, joined by JUSTICE
GINSBURG, JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, and JUSTICE KAGAN, agreed that 15 U. S. C. §1052(a)
constitutes viewpoint discrimination, concluding:
(a) With
few narrow exceptions, a fundamental principle of the First Amendment is that
the government may not punish or suppress speech based on disapproval of the
ideas or perspectives the speech conveys. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819,
828–829. The test for viewpoint discrimination is whether—within the relevant
subject category—the government has singled out a subset of messages for
disfavor based on the views expressed. Here, the disparagement clause
identifies the relevant subject as “persons, living or dead, institutions,
beliefs, or national symbols,” §1052(a); and within that category, an applicant
may register a positive or benign mark but not a derogatory one. The law thus
reflects the Government’s disapproval of a subset of messages it finds
offensive, the essence of viewpoint discrimination. The Government’s arguments
in defense of the statute are unpersuasive. Pp. 2–5.
(b)
Regardless of whether trademarks are commercial speech, the viewpoint based
discrimination here necessarily invokes heightened scrutiny. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U. S.
552, 566. To the extent trademarks qualify as commercial speech, they are an
example of why that category does not serve as a blanket exemption from the
First Amendment’s requirement of viewpoint neutrality. In the realm of
trademarks, the metaphorical marketplace of ideas becomes a tangible, powerful
reality. To permit viewpoint discrimination in this context is to permit
Government censorship. Pp. 5–7.
ALITO, J.,
announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with
respect to Parts I, II, and III–A, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and KENNEDY,
GINSBURG, BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined, and in which THOMAS, J.,
joined except for Part II, and an opinion with respect to Parts III–B, III–C,
and IV, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS and BREYER, JJ., joined. KENNEDY,
J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in
which GINSBURG, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed an opinion
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. GORSUCH, J., took no part in
the consideration or decision of the case.