China’s Fishing Militia
Swarms Philippine Island, Seeking Edge in Sea Dispute
By Niharika Mandhana (WSJ)
April 4, 2019 11:21 a.m. ET
The boats’ presence
is illegal and violates Manila’s sovereignty, the Philippines foreign ministry
says
HONG KONG—Chinese fishing vessels have swarmed the waters
around a Philippine-controlled island in the South China Sea in recent
months—sparking fears in Manila that Beijing is trying to assert greater
control in a disputed area.
Since January, at least 275 Chinese boats functioning as
part of a maritime militia have gathered for varying lengths of time near Thitu Island, according to the Philippines’ military. Their
tactics raise concerns about their “role in support of coercive objectives,”
the country’s foreign ministry said Thursday.
The fishing boats’ presence is illegal and violates
Philippine sovereignty, the ministry said in a rare jab at China by President
Rodrigo Duterte’s government, which has sought closer economic ties with
Beijing.
China has long used its fishing fleet as part of what opponents term “gray zone” tactics to assert its territorial
claims and pressure countries contesting the Chinese position that is has
sovereignty over nearly all of the South China Sea.
China’s foreign ministry said in response to questions by
The Wall Street Journal that China has sovereignty over Thitu
Island, which Beijing calls Zhongye Island, and the
adjacent waters, and that it was “beyond reproach” for Chinese boats to fish
there.
“Chinese fishing boats and fishermen’s operations in these
waters have not changed much this year compared with previous years,” China’s
foreign ministry said.
Washington-based think tank Asia Maritime Transparency
Initiative, or AMTI, which first drew attention to the surge of vessels near Thitu Island in February, said a handful of Chinese vessels
had operated in the area since at least July 2018, but the numbers began
growing in December and rose to a high of 95 on one day. The timing of the
boats’ arrival appeared linked to construction activities on the island, AMTI
said.
The Philippines is building a beaching ramp to make it
easier for bigger ships to deliver supplies to Thitu
Island and plans to upgrade a runway and other infrastructure on it. The island
is home to a tiny population of Filipino civilians and troops. China has tried
to talk the Philippines out of the construction projects in the past,
Philippine officials have said.
Just over 12 nautical miles away, Beijing has built an
artificial island, Subi Reef, that represents the
creeping militarization of the waterway. The outpost is equipped with hangars
for combat aircraft, missile shelters and communications or radar facilities,
AMTI’s analysis of satellite imagery shows.
Some Filipino officials worry the Chinese vessels’ continued
presence is restricting access to the waters around Thitu
Island, where Filipinos regularly fish. The region’s mayor told local media
earlier this year that Chinese boats were preventing Filipino fishermen from
reaching one of the sandbars near Thitu Island.
Chinese fishing vessels played a role in a 2012 standoff that resulted in China
seizing a fisheries-rich feature, Scarborough Shoal, from the Philippines.
“They’re making it
more and more difficult so that the fishermen eventually give up and China
enlarges its area of control,” said Jay Batongbacal,
director of the Philippines-based Institute for Maritime Affairs and Law of the
Sea. “In a way, they are already cut off.”
A U.S. Defense Department report last year said large
numbers of Chinese militiamen train with Chinese navy and coast guard ships and
some use state-supplied vessels that have reinforced hulls and ammunition
storage. China uses maritime militia for “low-intensity coercion activities to
advance territorial and maritime claims,” the report said.
The fishing vessels physically obstruct fishermen from other
countries by showing up in large numbers and even bumping and ramming their
boats. They are frequently backed up by China’s coast guard, with navy ships on
the horizon to project strength, following a pattern of layered deployment some
analysts call the “cabbage strategy.”
Most militiamen are commercial fishermen who can be pressed
into service as paramilitary personnel, experts say. They often operate in
civilian guise so that their activities can be framed as private actions,
according to an analysis by Conor M. Kennedy, a
researcher at the U.S.-based China Maritime Studies Institute, published in a
new book on the subject.
AMTI said in its February report that the vessels near Thitu Island had no gear in the water that would indicate
they were fishing and had turned off their location trackers. It also noted
that a small number of Chinese navy and coast guard ships were a short distance
away.
Mr. Duterte’s government has struggled to articulate a
response. Salvador Panelo, the president’s spokesman,
said earlier this week that while the military’s position was that the vessels
belonged to militiamen, China called them fishermen. “That’s why we are asking,
what’s the definition of militia?” he said.
In August 2017, the Philippines started building a shelter
for its fishermen on an unoccupied sandbar close to Thitu
Island. China protested, saying the two sides had agreed not to occupy new
features in the South China Sea, according to Philippine Defense Secretary
Delfin Lorenzana. President Duterte scrapped the hut
building.
That month, opposition politician Gary Alejano,
a critic of Mr. Duterte’s pro-China policies, flagged suspicious Chinese
maritime activity: a few fishing, coast guard and navy ships near Thitu Island. The 2018 U.S. Defense Department report also
noted that China had used all three forces to patrol around the island that
month and planted a flag on a sandbar.
Some in the Philippines worry China one day could occupy one
or more of the sandbars. Such a step would expand China’s presence to Thitu Island’s doorstep, said Mr. Batongbacal.
“China is using incremental steps to nudge other countries
out,” Mr. Batongbacal said. “They’re playing the long
game.”
—Chunying
Zhang in Beijing contributed to this article.
Write to Niharika Mandhana at niharika.mandhana@wsj.com