WISCONSIN v. MITCHELL, (1993)
No. 92-515
Argued: April 21, 1993 Decided: June 11,
1993
Pursuant to a Wisconsin
statute, respondent Mitchell's sentence for aggravated battery was enhanced
because he intentionally selected his victim on account of
the victim's race. The State Court of Appeals rejected his challenge to the
law's constitutionality, but the State Supreme Court reversed. Relying on R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 , it held that the statute
violates the First Amendment by punishing what the legislature has deemed to be
offensive thought and rejected the State's contention that the law punishes
only the conduct of intentional victim selection. It also found that the
statute was unconstitutionally overbroad because the evidentiary use of a
defendant's prior speech would have a chilling effect on those who fear they
may be prosecuted for offenses subject to penalty enhancement. Finally, it
distinguished antidiscrimination laws, which have long been held
constitutional, on the ground that they prohibit
objective acts of discrimination, whereas the state statute punishes the
subjective mental process.
Held: Mitchell's First Amendment rights were not
violated by the application of the penalty-enhancement provision in sentencing
him. Pp. 483-490.
(a) While Mitchell
correctly notes that this Court is bound by a state court's interpretation of a
state statute, the State Supreme Court did not construe the instant statute in
the sense of defining the meaning of a particular word
or phrase. Rather, it characterized the statute's practical effect for First
Amendment purposes. Thus, after resolving any ambiguities in the statute's
meaning, this Court may form its own judgment about the law's operative effect.
The State's argument that the statute punishes only conduct does not dispose of
Mitchell's claim, since the fact remains that the same criminal conduct is more
heavily punished if the victim is selected because of his protected status than
if no such motive obtains. Pp. 483-485.
(b) In determining what
sentence to impose, sentencing judges have traditionally considered a wide
variety of factors in addition to evidence bearing on guilt, including a
defendant's motive for committing the offense. While it is equally true that a
sentencing judge may not take into consideration a defendant's abstract
beliefs, however obnoxious to most people, the Constitution does not erect a
per se barrier to the [508 U.S. 476, 477] admission of evidence
concerning one's beliefs and associations at sentencing simply because they are
protected by the First Amendment. Dawson
v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159 ; Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939(plurality opinion). That Dawson
and Barclay did not involve the application of a penalty-enhancement provision
does not make them inapposite. Barclay involved the consideration of racial
animus in determining whether to sentence a defendant to death, the most severe
"enhancement" of all; and the state legislature has the primary
responsibility for fixing criminal penalties. Motive plays the same role under
the state statute as it does under federal and state antidiscrimination laws,
which have been upheld against constitutional challenge. Nothing in R.A.V. v. St. Paul, supra, compels a
different result here. The ordinance at issue there was explicitly directed at
speech, while the one here is aimed at conduct unprotected by the First
Amendment. Moreover, the State's desire to redress what it sees as the greater
individual and societal harm inflicted by bias-inspired conduct provides an
adequate explanation for the provision over and above mere disagreement with
offenders' beliefs or biases. Pp. 485-488.
(c) Because the statute
has no "chilling effect" on free speech, it is not unconstitutionally
overbroad. The prospect of a citizen suppressing his bigoted beliefs for fear
that evidence of those beliefs will be introduced against him at trial if he
commits a serious offense against person or property is too speculative a
hypothesis to support this claim. Moreover, the First Amendment permits the
admission of previous declarations or statements to establish the elements of a
crime or to prove motive or intent, subject to evidentiary rules dealing with
relevancy, reliability, and the like. Haupt
v. United States, 330 U.S. 631 . Pp. 488-490.
169
Wis.2d 153, 485 N.W.2d 807 (1992), reversed and remanded.
REHNQUIST, C.J,, delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.