SEI FUJII,
Appellant, v. THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Respondent
38 Cal. 2d 718; 242 P.2d 617; 1952 Cal. LEXIS 221
(1952)
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant alien resident sought review of
a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County (California), declaring
that certain land purchased by him had escheated to respondent State under the
California Alien Land Law, Cal. Gen. Laws, Act 261, §§ 1, 2, and 7 (1945).
OPINION
[**619] Plaintiff, an alien Japanese who is ineligible
to citizenship under our naturalization laws, appeals from a judgment declaring
that certain land purchased by him in 1948 had escheated to the state. There is
no treaty between this country and Japan which confers upon plaintiff the right
to own land, and the sole question presented on
this appeal is the validity of the California Alien Land Law. 1
United
Nations Charter
It is first contended that
the land law has been invalidated and superseded by the provisions of the
United Nations Charter pledging the member nations to promote the observance of
human rights and fundamental freedoms without distinction as to race. Plaintiff
relies on statements in the preamble and in articles 1, 55 and 56 of the
charter. 2
It is not disputed that the
charter is a treaty, and our federal Constitution provides
that treaties made under the authority of the United States are part of [**620] the
supreme law of the land and that the judges in every state are bound thereby.
(U.S. Const., art. VI)
(1) A treaty, however, does
not automatically supersede local laws which are inconsistent with it unless
the treaty provisions are self-executing. In the words of Chief Justice
Marshall: A treaty is "to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent
to an act of the Legislature, whenever it operates of itself, without the aid
of any legislative provision. But when the terms of the stipulation import a
contract—when either of the parties engages to perform a particular act, the
treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department; and the
Legislature must execute the contract, before it can become a rule for the
court." ( Foster v. Neilson (1829), 2 Pet. (U.S.) 253, 314 [7 L.Ed. 415].) 3
(2) In determining whether a
treaty is self-executing courts look to the intent of the signatory parties as
manifested by the language of the instrument, and, if the instrument is
uncertain, recourse may be had to the circumstances surrounding its execution.
(See Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. (U.S.) 253, 310-316 [7 L.Ed. 415]; United States v. Percheman, 7 Pet. (U.S.) 51, 58-59 [8 L.Ed.
604]; Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 10-23 [20 S.Ct.
1, 5-10, 44 L.Ed. 49]; Chew Heong v. United States, 112
U.S. 536, 539-543 [5 S.Ct. 255, 256-258, 28 L.Ed. 770]; Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 119 [53 S.Ct. 305, 311, 77 L.Ed. 641];
cf. Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47, 52 [49 S.Ct.
223, 224, 73 L.Ed. 607].)
(3) In order for a treaty
provision to be operative without the aid of implementing legislation and to
have the force and effect of a statute, it must appear that the framers of the
treaty intended to prescribe a rule that, standing alone, would be enforceable
in the courts. (See Head Money Cases [Edye v.
Robertson], 112 U.S. 580, 598 [5 S.Ct. 247, 254,
28 L.Ed. 798]; Whitney
v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 [8 S.Ct. 456, 458,
31 L.Ed. 386]; Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 118-119 [53 S.Ct. 305, 311, 77 L.Ed. 641];
Valentine v. United States, 299 U.S. 5, 10 [57 S.Ct. 100, 103, 81 L.Ed. 5]; Bacardi Corp. v. Domenech, 311 U.S.
150, 161 [61 S.Ct. 219, 225, 85 L.Ed.
98].)
(4) It is clear that the
provisions of the preamble and of article 1 of the charter which are claimed to
be in conflict with the alien land law are not self-executing. They state
general purposes and objectives of the United Nations Organization and do not
purport to impose legal obligations on the individual member nations or to [**621] create
rights in private persons. (5) It is equally clear that none of
the other provisions relied on by plaintiff is self-executing. Article 55
declares that the United Nations "shall promote . . . universal respect
for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion," and in article 56,
the member nations "pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in
cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth
in Article 55." Although the member nations have
obligated themselves to cooperate with the international organization in
promoting respect for, and observance of, human rights, it is plain that it was
contemplated that future legislative action by the several nations would be
required to accomplish the declared objectives, and there is nothing to
indicate that these provisions were intended to become rules of law for the
courts of this country upon the ratification of the charter.
The language used in articles
55 and 56 is not the type customarily employed in treaties which have been held
to be self-executing and to create rights and duties in individuals. For example, the treaty involved in Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 507-508 [67 S.Ct.
1431, 1434, 91 L.Ed. 1633, 170 A.L.R. 953],
relating to the rights of a national of one country to inherit real property
located in another country, specifically provided that "such national
shall be allowed a term of three years in which to sell the property . . . and
withdraw the proceeds . . ." free from any discriminatory taxation. (See,
also, Hauenstein v. Lynham,
100 U.S. 483, 488-490 [25 L.Ed. 628].) In Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47, 50 [49 S.Ct.
223, 73 L.Ed. 607], the provision treated as being
self-executing was equally definite. There each of the signatory parties agreed
that "no higher or other duties, charges, or taxes of any kind, shall be
levied" by one country on removal of property therefrom by citizens of the
other country "than are or shall be payable in each State, upon the same,
when removed by a citizen or subject of such state respectively." In other
instances treaty provisions were enforced without
implementing legislation where they prescribed in detail the rules governing
rights and obligations of individuals or specifically provided that citizens of
one nation shall have the same rights while in the other country as are enjoyed
by that country's own citizens. (Bacardi Corp. v. Domenech,
4 311 U.S. 150, 158-159 [61 S.Ct. 219,
224, 85 L.Ed. 98]; Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332,
340 [44 S.Ct. 515, 516, 68 L.Ed.
1041]; see Maiorano v. Baltimore & Ohio
R.R. Co., 213 U.S. 268, 273-274 [29 S.Ct. 424,
425-426, 53 L.Ed. 792]; Chew Heong v. United States, 112
U.S. 536, 541-542 [5 S.Ct. 255, 257, 28 L.Ed. 770].)
It is significant to note
that when the framers of the charter intended to make certain provisions
effective without the aid of implementing legislation they employed language
which is clear and definite and manifests that intention. For example, article
104 provides: "The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of
its Members such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its
functions and the fulfillment of its purposes." Article 105 provides:
"1. The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members
such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfillment of its
purposes. 2. Representatives of the Members of the
United Nations and officials of the Organization shall similarly enjoy such
privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of
their functions in connection with the Organization." In Curran v. City of New York, 77 N.Y.S.2d 206, 212, these
articles were treated as being self-executory. (See, also, Balfour, Guthrie & Co. v. United States, 90 F.Supp. 831, 832.)
The provisions in the charter
pledging cooperation in promoting observance of [**622] fundamental freedoms lack the mandatory quality and definiteness which
would indicate an intent to create justiciable rights in private persons
immediately upon ratification. Instead, they are framed as a promise of future
action by the member nations. Secretary of State Stettinius, chairman of the
United States delegation at the San Francisco Conference where the charter was
drafted, stated in his report to President Truman that article 56 "pledges
the various countries to cooperate with the organization by joint and separate
action in the achievement of the economic and social objectives of the
organization without infringing upon their right to order their national
affairs according to their own best ability, in their own way, and in
accordance with their own political and economic institutions and
processes." (Report to the President on the Results of the San Francisco
Conference by the Chairman of the United States Delegation, the Secretary of
State, Department of State Publication 2349, Conference Series 71, p. 115;
Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate
[Revised] July 9-13, 1945, p. 106.) The same view was repeatedly expressed by
delegates of other nations in the debates attending
the drafting of article 56. (See U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 699, II/3/40, May 30, 1945,
pp. 1-3; U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 684, II/3/38, May 29, 1945, p. 4; Kelsen,
The Law of the United Nations [1950], footnote 9, pp. 100-102.)
The humane and enlightened
objectives of the United Nations Charter are, of course, entitled to respectful
consideration by the courts and legislatures of every member nation, since that
document expresses the universal desire of thinking men for peace and for
equality of rights and opportunities. The charter represents a moral commitment
of foremost importance, and we must not permit the spirit of our pledge to be
compromised or disparaged in either our domestic or foreign affairs. (6) We are satisfied, however, that the charter
provisions relied on by plaintiff were not intended
to supersede existing domestic legislation, and we cannot hold that they
operate to invalidate the Alien Land Law.
* * * *
The judgment is
reversed.
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1
The pertinent portions of the alien land law (1 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 261),
as amended in 1945, are as follows:
"§ 1. All aliens eligible to
citizenship under the laws of the United States may acquire, possess, enjoy,
use, cultivate, occupy, transfer, transmit and inherit real property, or any
interest therein, in this state, and have in whole or in part the beneficial
use thereof, in the same manner and to the same extent as citizens of the
United States, except as otherwise provided by the laws of this state.
"§ 2. All aliens other than those
mentioned in section one of this act may acquire, possess, enjoy, use,
cultivate, occupy and transfer real property, or any interest therein, in this
state, and have in whole or in part the beneficial use thereof, in the manner and
to the extent, and for the purposes prescribed by any treaty now existing
between the government of the United States and the nation or country of which
such alien is a citizen or subject, and not otherwise. . . .
"§ 7. Any real property hereafter
acquired in fee in violation of the provisions of this act by any alien
mentioned in Section 2 of this act, . . . shall escheat as of the date of such
acquiring, to, and become and remain the property of the state of California. .
. ."
2
The preamble recites that "We the peoples of the
United Nations determined . . . to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights .
. . and for these ends . . . to employ international machinery for the
promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples; have resolved
to combine our efforts to accomplish these aims."
Article 1 states that
"The Purposes of the United Nations are: . . . 3. To achieve international
co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social,
cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect
for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to
race, sex, language, or religion . . ."
Articles 55 and 56 appear in
chapter IX, entitled "International Economic and Social Cooperation."
Article 55 provides: "With a view to the creation of
conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and
friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal
rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote:
a. higher standards of living,
full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and
development;
b. solutions of international
economic, social, health, and related problems; and international cultural and
educational cooperation; and
c. universal respect for, and
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion."
Article 56 provides:
"All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in
cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth
in Article 55."
3
In Foster v. Neilson, certain treaty provisions were held not to be
self-executing on the basis of construction of the English version of the
document. Subsequently, upon consideration of the Spanish version, the
provisions in question were held to be self-executing. ( United States v. Percheman, 7 Pet.
(U.S.) 51 [8 L.Ed. 604].) Chief Justice
Marshall's language in the Foster case, however, has been quoted with approval
in later cases. ( United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 417-418 [7 S.Ct. 234, 239-240, 30 L.Ed. 425];
Valentine v. United States, 299 U.S. 5, 10 [57 S.Ct. 100, 103, 81 L.Ed. 5].)
4
It should be noted, however, that the treaty involved in the Bacardi case also
contained a specific provision, not discussed by the court, that its terms
"shall have the force of law in those States in which international
treaties possess that character, as soon as they are ratified by their
constitutional organs." (311 U.S. 150, 159 [61 S.Ct. 219,
224, 85 L.Ed. 98].)
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